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“The history of no other European people has been so decisively 
modified by a frontier as Castile, for century after century”  
–Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, in Burns (1989, p. 325). 
 
I. Introduction 
This paper shows that the legacy of history is particularly pervasive in Spain. We provide 
evidence to show that a historical process that ended more than five centuries ago, the 
Reconquest, is very important to explain Spanish regional economic development. The so-
called Reconquista is a milestone in Spanish history. For a period of almost eight hundred 
years that started in 711 with the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by the Muslims, what is 
now mainland Spain experienced a process fairly akin to colonialism. Throughout this long 
period, and after an initial phase of mere resistance, the Christians located in the north 
gradually reconquered the Muslim lands and implemented measures to colonize the 
reclaimed territory. We argue that the rate or speed of the Reconquest, that is, whether the 
Christian frontier advanced rapidly or not, was a crucial factor affecting the type of 
colonization conducted in each territory and its corresponding initial political equilibrium. 
A fast rate of Reconquest is associated with imperfect colonization, characterized by an 
oligarchic political equilibrium, thus creating the conditions for an inegalitarian society 
with negative consequences for long-term economic development. 
This paper is framed within a new stream of literature dealing with the long-term effects 
of frontier expansions. In a recent contribution, García-Jimeno and Robinson (2011) have 
proposed the “conditional frontier hypothesis” to explain the starkly contrasting outcomes 
derived from the frontier experiences in North America (Turner, 1920) and Latin America 
(Hennessy, 1978). According to this hypothesis, the consequences of the frontier depend on 
the initial political equilibrium existing in society at the time of the territorial expansion. In 
North America, where the prevailing social climate was relatively democratic and 
egalitarian, the frontier brought about individualism, self-government and aversion to social 
stratification, whereas in the more oligarchic societies of South America, the presence of a 
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frontier reinforced economic and political inequality.1 Focusing on the historical border 
between Castile and the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada in southern Spain, Oto-Peralías and 
Romero-Ávila (2015) have suggested that military insecurity is a factor that favors a 
political equilibrium biased toward the military elite in frontier regions, generating 
persistent differences in inequality. 
This article argues that the political equilibrium among the colonizing agents may be 
endogenous to the scale of frontier expansion. This is because large territorial expansion 
allows the elite to play a dominant role in the process of colonizing the conquered lands. 
Applied to our case study, this became evident after the collapse of the Almohad Caliphate 
in 1212 following the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, which enabled the Christian armies to 
conquer vast swathes of territory in a short period of time. The outcome involved large 
frontier regions dominated by military orders and the nobility, with negative consequences 
for long-term development. In contrast, a slow frontier expansion was associated with a 
more balanced occupation of the territory and a more egalitarian social structure. This was 
so because smaller frontier regions favored the participation of individual settlers and the 
Crown in the repopulation, which would lead to better political institutions and a more 
equitable distribution of the land – as happened in the colonization of the Duero Valley, 
where settlers occupied land and obtained its ownership. As argued below, these initial 
differences in the patterns of distribution of economic and political power persisted over 
time, and led to divergent development paths across what are now the Spanish provinces.  
This paper also contributes in several ways to a growing body of research that considers 
economic development as a long-term process with deep historical roots (Spolaore and 
Wacziarg 2013; Nunn 2014).2 First, our case study is appealing in the sense that the 
                                                 
1 Their analysis of the frontiers on the American continent provides evidence of both higher long-term 
economic growth and levels of democracy, the greater the constraints on the executive in 1850 and the larger 
the frontier. 
2 Examples of this vibrant literature are Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2008), 
Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman (2002), Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Angeles (2007), Gennaioli and Rainer 
(2007), Baten and van Zanden (2008), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Angeles and Neanidis (2009), Iyer 
(2010), Dell (2010), Gallego (2010), Naritomi et al. (2012), Bruhn and Gallego (2012), Easterly and Levine 
(2003, 2014), Ashraf and Galor (2013), Alsan (2014), Cook (2014), and Fenske (2013, 2014). 
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historical process studied in this article is very remote in time. The Reconquest ended in 
1492 with the fall of Granada yet, significantly, its effects remain visible today. Explaining 
the reasons for the effect of the Reconquest being so persistent, along with the channels 
through which it took place, are questions of general interest. Second, our work is also 
interesting because unlike most previous studies focusing on former colonies, it analyzes 
the experience of a developed economy that became a leading colonial power in the 
Mercantilist era of colonialism.3 
Third, a particularity of the Spanish case is that over a long period of time its territory 
experienced a process very similar to colonialism. Thus, an analysis of the Spanish 
Reconquest is useful because it gives clues about the subsequent colonization of the New 
World. When Spain colonized Central and South America in the sixteenth century, it had 
all the experience gained in the Reconquest and through the policies implemented in the 
occupation of Muslim lands. Therefore, while the recent literature has emphasized that 
Spanish colonial policies were significantly influenced by the preexisting indigenous 
organization in conquered areas (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Frankema 2010), it should 
not be ignored that the granting of large tracts of land to the nobility, for example, had a 
clear precedent in the homeland.4 Interestingly, the Spanish Reconquest constitutes a 
historical process that resembles the long-term outcomes of the colonization of North and 
South America. As with the contrast between northern and southern Spain, in North 
America (the US and Canada) a type of colony based on smallholder farmers of European 
descent flourished, whereas in Central and South America landowners with large estates 
predominated, along with other institutions such as the encomienda that perpetuated a 
highly unequal society (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, 2000). 
                                                 
3 See Acemoglu et al. (2011a, 2011b) for other studies on historical events taking place in non-colonies. 
4 In the territories of the southern plateau and Andalusia, the Crown granted large estates (or encomiendas) to 
the military orders and the nobility (Brenan 1943). “An encomienda was an estate given by the King in 
señorío, or with full manorial rights, for one lifetime or for some determinate period only. The Comendador 
was the title of the temporary possessor, who enjoyed all or most of the rights of the King. After the twelfth 
century encomiendas died out except in the military orders, in which they were the recognized form of land 
tenure” (Brenan 1943, p. 113). 
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In the empirical part of the paper, we create an indicator measuring the “rate of 
Reconquest”, which captures whether the Christian military conquests progressed rapidly 
or slowly when each province was reclaimed. We show that there is a robustly negative 
relationship between the rate of Reconquest and current per capita income across today’s 
Spanish provinces. This relationship does not simply reflect the fact that regions in the 
South are poorer, since the results survive the inclusion of latitude. The effect remains 
statistically significant when the regression analysis is extended to the level of 
municipality, even after controlling for province fixed effects. The results are not driven by 
a selection problem informed by the possibility that –for instance– the Christian kingdoms 
chose to conquer faster economically less attractive territories. A number of falsification 
tests show that there is no link between the rate of Reconquest and several indicators of pre-
Reconquest economic development. 
We also analyze the channels through which the rate of Reconquest has affected current 
income. The results suggest that the concentrations of economic and political power played 
central roles as intervening variables. This is consistent with the hypothesis formulated by 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) 
whereby a high concentration of economic and political power in a few hands has impaired 
modern economic growth because it precludes large segments of the population from 
participating in economic activity when the opportunity to industrialize arrived. The timing 
of the effect of the Reconquest is consistent with this hypothesis, since its negative effect 
became apparent during the industrialization period (but not before). This interpretation is 
also congruent with the fact that although in 1860 (the onset of industrialization in Spain) 
the negative impact of the rate of Reconquest on per capita income was still absent, the 
effect was already present in some of the foundations of modern economic growth, such as 
human capital. A general conclusion of our analysis is that accelerated (and imperfect) 
colonization may create the conditions for an inegalitarian society, with negative 
consequences for long-term economic development. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical 
overview of the Spanish Reconquest. Section 3 describes the indicator for the rate of 
Reconquest and the other variables used in the paper. Section 4 presents the analysis of the 
effect the Reconquest has had on current economic development, while Section 5 provides 
several sensitivity analyses. Section 6 analyzes the timing of the effect of the Reconquest, 
and Section 7 investigates the possible channels through which this effect occurs. Finally, 
Section 8 puts forward some implications, and concludes. 
II. Historical Background5 
An interesting feature of Spanish history is that for a period of almost eight hundred years 
the Iberian Peninsula experienced a process somewhat akin to colonialism. In 711, what is 
now the Spanish mainland was invaded by the Muslims, who in a very short period of time 
occupied almost the whole of the Iberian Peninsula and created a Muslim domain that was 
known as al-Andalus. This western European Muslim territory achieved great economic 
and cultural development, and for most of the period under Moorish rule it was the most 
advanced country on the continent (Chejne 1999). With the passage of time, the Christian 
outposts located in northern Spain gradually conquered the Muslim territory in a process 
that lasted until 1492, with the fall of the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada. This long period of 
Christian conquest is known as the Reconquista. Military campaigns were followed by a 
process of colonization or repopulation of the new lands. The way in which the 
colonization was conducted had fundamental consequences for each region’s ensuing 
development.6 
The crucial outcomes of the repopulation process were how land was distributed and who 
held political power. Other potential aspects of relevance were the resulting level of 
population density, the degree of integration of the Muslim population, and the extent to 
                                                 
5 This historical overview draws on Sánchez Albornoz (1932), Brenan (1943), Dominguez-Ortiz (1955), Herr 
(1958), Vicens Vives (1969), Malefakis (1970), Sobrequés (1972), Carrión (1975), Ruiz-Maya (1979), Glick 
(1979), Mestre-Campi and Sabaté (1998), Guichard (2002) and García-Ormaechea (2002). 
6 Spanish historiography labels repopulation as the process of colonization of the reconquered lands by the 
Christian kingdoms. In this paper, we use the terms colonization and repopulation indistinctly to refer to this 
process. 
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which preexisting technologies were preserved. An important factor that decisively affected 
the outcome of the repopulation was the speed of the Christian conquests; that is, whether 
the Christian frontier advanced rapidly or slowly (Sobrequés 1972; Malefakis 1970). We 
call this factor “rate of Reconquest”. A slow process in this case is generally associated 
with a more complete and balanced repopulation. This is because a smaller area to be 
colonized favored the participation of individual settlers and the Crown in the repopulation, 
which led to better political institutions and a more egalitarian distribution of land. By 
contrast, a rapid process is associated with imperfect colonization (González Jiménez, 
2006). In this case, a larger area to be repopulated implied fewer resources were available 
relative to the magnitude of the task; that is, an insufficient number of settlers, as well as 
administrative and military difficulties to govern and defend the territory. This favored the 
participation of the nobility and military orders in the organization and defense of the new 
lands.  
Figure 1 shows how the rate of Reconquest differs markedly across the different stages of 
this historical process. During the first three and half centuries of the Reconquest (from 711 
to 1062) the Christian kingdoms conquered about 155,000 km2, while over the next two 
centuries (until 1266) the reconquered area almost doubled (about 287,000 km2). Thus, the 
rate of Reconquest (i.e., the area reconquered divided by the duration in years of that 
period) was much slower in the first period (approx. 441 km2/year) than in the second 
period (approx. 1407 km2/year). These differences had profound consequences for the type 
of colonization conducted in each case. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A slow rate of Reconquest implied that individual settlers with few economic resources 
could colonize the territory by themselves. This was the case of the repopulation of the 
Duero Valley, where the distinctive feature of this process was the predominance of private 
initiative; that is, a type of repopulation conducted by individuals who occupied land and 
acquired its property through the institution of presura or aprisio (i.e., apprehension of 
land). In general, this repopulation implied a more balanced occupation of the land, as 
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reflected in the presence of a large number of small settlements that appear evenly 
distributed across the repopulated territory. It also led to the creation of a society with a 
democratic structure of free peasants with access to land (Vicens Vives 1969).7 The Crown 
also found it easier to organize the repopulation when the area to be occupied was not large. 
Thus, in the lands comprised between the rivers Duero and Tagus the repopulation was to a 
large extent officially organized and conducted by the King through the creation of 
municipalities or councils (repoblación concejil), which delimited and distributed 
smallholdings among settlers (Ruiz-Maya 1979). When the repopulation was conducted by 
the Crown, the result was still beneficial to the peasantry, since land was relatively well 
distributed and cities remained under royal jurisdiction.8 
In addition, a smaller area to be repopulated (consequence of a slow rate of Reconquest) 
favored the preservation of Muslim agricultural technologies and the integration of the 
Muslim population. Indeed, the repopulation in Aragon was different than in Castile, 
largely due to the smaller area this kingdom reconquered. In this case, the King was able to 
carefully organize the colonization, and the nobility played a smaller role (Sobrequés 
1972). In contrast to Castile, the repopulation of Aragon had such particularities as a higher 
concern for maintaining irrigation structures, greater respect for the Muslim population, and 
less reward for the aristocracy for their participation in the conquest and defense of new 
territories (Casado-Alonso 2002; Vicens Vives 1969). 
The above contrasts with the situation in the stages of the Reconquest comprised between 
1062 and 1266, particularly in Castile, where the Christian conquests progressed much 
more rapidly. The larger areas to be repopulated rendered it unfeasible to colonize through 
individual settlers. Likewise, it was also difficult for the King to be able to organize the 
repopulation on such a large scale. The intervention of the nobility and military orders was 
                                                 
7 The northern and mountainous territories that did not fall under Muslim control were characterized by the 
existence of few large estates, as well as by a social structure composed of a majority of free men and little 
class differentiation (Glick 1979). 
8 Under royal jurisdiction, the peasantry faced a smaller tax burden than under noble jurisdiction, where 
seigneurial duties were added to state taxes (García-Ormaechea 2002). 
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therefore required in order to conduct an effective occupation and defense of the new 
lands.9 This situation was intensified after the Muslim defeat at the Battle of Las Navas de 
Tolosa in 1212. In a short period of time (between 1225 and 1250), most of the southern 
third of the peninsula suddenly fell into Christian hands (Malefakis 1970). By the mid-
thirteenth century, the Reconquest was almost complete, with the exception being the 
Nasrid Kingdom of Granada. This gives an indication of the huge demographic effort that 
Castile would need to make in the thirteenth century in order to simultaneously repopulate 
Andalusia, La Mancha, Murcia and the majority of Extremadura (González Jiménez, 2006). 
The magnitude of the frontier expansion profoundly affected the subsequent social 
reorganization (Sobrequés 1972; Malefakis 1970). “[G]iven the weak resources of the 
period, the Castilians had to deploy enormous effort in order to cater for the administration, 
defense, and economic development of these southern lands [...] Inevitably, the disparity 
between the magnitude of the task and the precarious resources available produced 
problems. One of these was the birth of the great landed estates” (Cabrera Muñoz, 1989, p. 
465); another was the concentration of political power in the hands of the nobility. 
In a context in which the rapid advance of the Christian frontier created clear problems of 
manpower and resources, the Crown found in the military orders and the nobility the most 
“effective means of defense in the border region” (Forey 1984, p. 214). The warrior-monks 
and warlords were clearly the best alternative for holding and defending extensive areas in 
the frontier regions. Since the Castilian kings by themselves were unable to administer and 
organize such a huge territory, they granted large estates and jurisdictional rights to the 
nobility and military orders. As a result, the concentration of landownership and the 
proportion of territory under the jurisdiction of nobles or military orders were the highest in 
                                                 
9 Following the example of the Holy Land crusaders, the Castilians created three great military orders that 
served as armies for the kingdom to conquer Muslim lands and defend the Christian frontier. The order of 
Calatrava was founded in 1158, the order of Santiago in 1170, and the order of Alcántara in 1176, all during 
the second half of the twelfth century, a period from which military orders grew in importance due to their 
key role in the defense of the frontier (González Jiménez 1989). 
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the regions of Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and Andalusia.10 In addition, a rapid rate of 
Reconquest made it difficult to govern the Muslim population and preserve their 
agricultural technologies. Thus, the previously intensive agriculture of the Guadalquivir 
Valley dramatically changed after the expulsion of the Moors from Andalusia following the 
1264 revolt, being replaced by an extensive agrarian sector dominated by olive groves and 
sheep (Vicens Vives 1969; Malefakis 1970). 
The existence of a link between the rate of Reconquest and the type of colonization is 
clearly reflected in the pattern of settlements in Spain. A rapid rate of Reconquest means a 
scarcity of settlers and economic resources, which gives rise to an unbalanced occupation 
of the territory consisting of an urban structure of few settlements involving large 
jurisdictional areas. In this sense, López-González et al. (1989) have argued that the size of 
municipal areas tends to increase as the Reconquest progressed, with the largest being on 
the Castilian side of Andalusia. Intuitively, when large territories have to be colonized with 
limited human and material resources, a disperse distribution of large settlements across the 
territory is more likely. In fact, there is a very positive relationship between the rate of 
Reconquest and municipal surface area (measured both in 1787 and 2011). Remarkably, the 
rate of Reconquest alone explains 61% of the variation in municipal area in 1787.11 This 
provides additional support for the fact that the scale of the frontier expansion affected the 
pattern of colonization of the conquered lands in a manner that is consistent with our line of 
argumentation. 
To sum up, the rate of Reconquest conditioned the type of colonization conducted in each 
region. A rapid rate favored a political equilibrium biased toward the nobility, creating 
societies with high levels of economic and political inequality –with other potential 
                                                 
10 Regarding the possibility that the concentration of land in Andalusia after the Reconquest merely reflected 
the situation under Muslim domination, Malefakis (1970) states that it is indisputable that land concentration 
in Moorish times was lower than under Castilian domination.  
11 The positive effect of rate of Reconquest on municipality size is robust to controlling for geographic 
variables such as soil quality, altitude and distance to the coast. As a falsification test, we also show that rate 
of Reconquest is not significantly related to average size of ancient (pre-medieval) settlements. Due to space 
considerations, detailed results are available in an unpublished appendix to this paper. 
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consequences being a low integration of the Muslim population and scant preservation of 
their technologies. In contrast, a slow rate of Reconquest led to a more balanced occupation 
of the territory and a more egalitarian social structure. We argue that initial differences in 
the type of repopulation created different development paths across today’s Spanish 
provinces, with implications for their current level of prosperity. Thus, we expect a 
negative relationship between the rate of Reconquest and current per capita income. After 
presenting the data used in the paper, the following sections test this prediction and provide 
evidence on the mechanisms at work. 
III. Rate of Reconquest and Other Data 
We construct a database for the 50 Spanish provinces that contains variables concerning 
the rate of Reconquest, current economic development, and many historical and geographic 
controls. Our main indicator for measuring the conditions and pace at which the 
Reconquest was made is labeled “rate of Reconquest”. It measures the total area of the 
stage of the Reconquest in which the province was conquered by  Christians, divided by the 
duration in years of that stage of the Reconquest. Therefore, the rate of Reconquest is a 
ratio of the amount of reconquered area divided by an interval of years. Intuitively, it 
reflects the speed at which the Christian frontier advanced and, consequently, the level of 
colonization effort required for the effective occupation of the province.  
We construct this variable as follows. First, using geospatial software we calculate the 
surface area of each stage of the Reconquest from detailed maps provided by Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998). In this first step, we differentiate between the areas conquered by the 
Kingdom of Castile and the Crown of Aragon. Regarding the initial area of resistance in 
northern Spain, since it was not effectively conquered by the Muslims and, therefore, not 
reconquered, we assume the reconquered area to be zero.12 Second, we calculate the 
duration in years of each stage of the Reconquest as the difference between the dates 
associated with each one of the subsequent frontier lines depicted in the map of the 
                                                 
12 As shown in Section IV.B, the effect of the rate of Reconquest is robust to the exclusion of the provinces 
corresponding to the initial area of resistance. 
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Reconquest in Figure 1. Third, we divide the surface area of each stage of the Reconquest 
by its duration in years. This provides a measure of the rate of Reconquest expressed in 
km2/year.13 A high value of this indicator implies that the Reconquest progressed quickly in 
that stage. Finally, we impute the estimated value of the rate of Reconquest to the provinces 
located in the respective stages. Since the area of a province can partially cover more than 
one stage of the Reconquest, we calculate the proportion of the provincial area within each 
one of the respective stages. We then compute the weighted average of the rate of 
Reconquest for each province, where the weights are given by the percentage of the 
provincial area conquered in each stage. 
The variable used to measure economic development is the figure for GDP per capita in 
2005 provided by the Spanish National Statistics Institute. This study also employs a 
number of variables that may act as potential channels for explaining the effect of the 
Reconquest, as well as measures of pre-Reconquest economic development and a wide 
array of climatic, geographic, topographic and historical controls. We present all these 
variables in the sections in which they are used. To save space, their definitions and sources 
are provided in the unpublished appendix (Table A1), while the descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table A2. 
IV. The Effect of the Reconquest on Current Development 
A. Initial Results 
Table 1 contains the results concerning the effect of the Reconquest on current levels of 
GDP per capita. The following equation is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors: 
Yi = α + β1·Reconquesti + β2·Xi + ωi    (1) 
where Yi is log per capita GDP in 2005 in province i, α is a constant term, Reconquesti 
stands for our measure of the rate of Reconquest, Xi is a vector of control variables, and ωi 
                                                 
13 More specifically, and in order to make the numbers manageable, this indicator is expressed in 100 
km2/year. 
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is the error term. Column 1 in Table 1 reports a highly significant, negative bivariate 
relationship between current GDP levels and the rate of Reconquest. Our measure of the 
Reconquest alone explains 30% of the variation in current GDP per capita. This result 
indicates that the Reconquest is an important determinant of the current distribution of 
provincial output. We may compare two provinces with high and low rates of Reconquest 
to gain a sense of the size of the effect the Reconquest has had on current GDP per capita. 
For instance, Barcelona has a level of GDP per capita that is 48% higher than Seville 
(24,782 vs. 16,782). The latter has a rate of Reconquest of 21.94, while for the former it is 
1.58. The estimate in column 1, –0.018, indicates that Barcelona should be 44% richer than 
Seville (e0.366 – 1 ≈ 0.44), which is very close to the real differences in income per capita. 
This result cannot be taken as conclusive, since the presence of unobserved province-level 
heterogeneity, if correlated with both the Reconquest and current economic development, 
would introduce an omitted variable bias in the relevant coefficient. Therefore, in the rest of 
this section we seek to exhaustively control for possible factors that may affect both the rate 
of Reconquest and current GDP per capita levels.  
A first set of controls is related to the biogeographic conditions 10,000 years ago, and the 
transition to early agriculture within the Neolithic Revolution. Accordingly, column 2 
introduces the percentage of provincial area covered by wooded steppe versus dry steppe. 
These were the types of Neolithic vegetation (as indicators of soil quality and agricultural 
suitability) that prevailed on the Iberian Peninsula in prehistory.14 Column 3 incorporates 
the predicted date of adoption of early agriculture using the information provided by 
Pinhasi, Fort, and Ammerman (2005) regarding the exact location of thirteen calibrated C-
14 dates from Neolithic sites on the Iberian Peninsula.15 Statistically, none of the Neolithic 
controls enters significantly for the Spanish provinces, whereas the effect of the Reconquest 
remains highly significant and largely unchanged in size. 
                                                 
14 The omitted category in the regression is dry steppe. Wooded steppe entailed a closed forest, including 
mixed conifer-broadleaf forest; and dry steppe implied sparse vegetation with open wooded vegetation types 
and a more temperate climate. See Olsson and Paik (2013) for more details.  
15 Olsson and Paik (2013) use this data source to analyze the effect of the early transition to agriculture on 
current development in the western agricultural core. 
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A second set of controls accounts for historical conditions that may be relevant factors 
omitted from our analysis. Column 4 introduces a variable measuring the road density level 
in Roman times, which could affect the progress of the Christian conquests, and may also 
be related to local development potential. This variable enters insignificantly in the 
regression, without altering the effect of the Reconquest. Column 5 controls for an indicator 
of pre-Reconquest economic development, namely, urban population density in 800.16 This 
is an important control variable, since the Christian frontier could arguably advance more 
slowly in more developed regions, because –for example– they offered stauncher 
resistance. The coefficient on urban population density in 800 is negative and statistically 
significant, while the effect of the Reconquest remains negative and statistically highly 
significant. Following a similar reasoning, the next column controls for an indicator of the 
level of economic development (urban population density) just before the Christians 
conquered and colonized the territory. In addition, column 7 includes a variable measuring 
the average urban population density in the Christian kingdoms at the time of the conquest. 
This variable sets out to reflect the general level of economic development of Castile or 
Aragon (depending on the case) immediately before the province was repopulated, since the 
type of colonization conducted could be affected by the conqueror’s level of prosperity at 
that time. These two last controls are insignificant in the regression, without affecting the 
coefficient on rate of Reconquest. 
Column 8 introduces an indicator measuring the number of centuries that the province 
was under Muslim domination. This may be a confounding variable since a longer Muslim 
domination could affect factors such as cultural values or the Spanish-Christian identity of 
the population. Interestingly, the coefficient on rate of Reconquest remains highly robust, 
while the new variable appears statistically insignificant.17 Column 9 introduces a dummy 
                                                 
16 In this regard, we follow Bairoch (1988), de Vries (1976), and more recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2002), who argue that urbanization is a good proxy for economic development, since urban 
societies require an advanced agriculture and a developed transport infrastructure. 
17 A possible way to analyze the Muslim cultural legacy is by looking at the Moorish ancestry in the current 
population of each province. The correlation between Moorish ancestry and the number of centuries under 
Muslim domination is below 5%.  In Section VII we discuss this question in more detail. 
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variable capturing whether the province once belonged to the Crown of Aragon. Certain 
institutional characteristics of this former kingdom may have had an impact on economic 
development. The dynastic union between the Crown of Aragon and Castile was forged in 
1469 with the marriage of the Catholic Monarchs, but Aragon preserved its legal system 
and institutions until the War of Spanish Succession at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. Arguably, these particularities during this early period could have influenced 
subsequent economic activity. Even though this historical control appears highly significant 
and positively related to current development levels, its inclusion does not affect our 
baseline results. Column 10 introduces a dummy variable for Madrid, the Spanish capital, 
in order to control for the fact that its good economic performance may have been driven by 
its special administrative character.18 As expected, the coefficient on Madrid is positive and 
highly significant. 
We next control for various climatic, geographic and topographic factors that may be 
omitted from the baseline specification. Many scholars consider geography to be an 
important determinant of economic development (Gallup et al. 1999; Sachs 2003). 
Following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), we may differentiate between simple 
and sophisticated geographic explanations. The first type considers factors such as climate 
(with effects on work effort), soil fertility, and diseases. It predicts persistence in economic 
outcomes because geographic factors are time-invariant. Sophisticated geographic 
hypotheses are more appealing because they allow for the possibility that some geographic 
factors have a changing economic role over time. Applied to the Spanish case, access to the 
Mediterranean Sea may have been more decisive during the Middle Ages, with subsequent 
access to the Atlantic through trade with the Americas, and more recently during the 
industrialization period to the Bay of Biscay. In addition, coal reserves played an important 
role during the industrialization period, but not all the provinces had their own reserves. 
Transportation costs –measured, for instance, through access to the sea or distance from 
                                                 
18 In addition to being the seat of government bureaucracy, which represents a flow of rents to its inhabitants, 
Madrid is the hub of Spain’s radial communication network, reflecting traditional government centralism 
(Herr 1958). This provides the capital of Spain with a privileged position as a business location. 
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major trading partners and industrial centers in Europe– could also have been more 
important during the nineteenth century, when commercial relations across regions and 
countries intensified. In order to dispel doubts, we next control for variables that may be 
associated with both sets of geographic hypotheses. We begin with factors exhibiting 
geographic variation along a North-South gradient that mimics the direction of the 
Reconquest. The incorporation of latitude into column 11 (which enters insignificantly) 
does not affect the statistical significance or size of the coefficient on rate of Reconquest. 
Therefore, our results do not simply capture the fact that southern Spanish regions are 
poorer. 
Columns 12-14 control for such variables as temperature, rainfall and humidity, which 
may also affect soil quality and its suitability for crops that require large estates (and in turn 
induce the concentration of economic power in the hands of the landed elite). Higher aridity 
and less rainfall may also require a higher concentration of land on the grounds of 
economic efficiency and profitability (Brenan 1943). Hence, they may be factors that 
confuse the long-term effect of the Reconquest on development. It is worth stressing that 
none of these factors enters significantly or reduces the statistical significance of the effect 
of the Reconquest.19 The baseline result remains unaltered when column 15 introduces a 
direct measure of soil quality constructed on the basis of several dimensions (nutrient 
availability and retention capacity, rooting conditions, oxygen availability to roots, excess 
salts, toxicity and workability) from FAO/IIASA (2010) data, which enters with a highly 
significant and positive coefficient. Columns 16-18 exploit provincial variation in the 
suitability of land for such cash crops as sugar, cotton and tobacco in order to capture the 
possibility of a contrast in the suitability of land for large plantations in the South of Spain 
as opposed to the North (as in the US). It is worth noting that none of these three controls 
appears statistically significant or affects the main findings. The introduction in columns 19 
and 20 of average altitude and terrain ruggedness does not alter the baseline results either. 
Only the former is marginally significant and with a negative coefficient. 
                                                 
19 Only humidity slightly reduces the size of the relevant coefficient from –0.018 to –0.015. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Columns 1-11 in Table 2 control for geographic attributes related to transportation costs 
that include access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Cantabrian Sea, a 
dummy indicator for being an island, a coast dummy, coast length over surface area, 
distance to the coast, border with Portugal, and distance from Madrid, London, and Paris. 
Of all these controls, only distance to the coast and border with Portugal are statistically 
significant and negatively associated with current development. Most importantly, the 
effect of the Reconquest remains fairly robust to these additions. Columns 12-16 control for 
indicators accounting for natural resource endowments that include the percentage of 
agricultural land in 1900, the percentage of arable land in 1962, log mining output in 1860, 
a coal dummy in 1860, and log coal output in 1860. Only provincial mining output is 
statistically significant and with a positive coefficient, whereas the baseline results remain 
unaltered.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
B. Baseline Specification and Robustness Checks 
Column 1 in Table 3 includes in the same specification all the controls that are 
individually significant. This is our paper’s baseline specification. Even in this case, the 
coefficient on the Reconquest measure is significant at the 1% level, and its size is not 
reduced. Besides, the dummies Crown of Aragon and Madrid, soil quality, and log mining 
output in 1860 continue to be statistically significant and positively associated with current 
development, while the coefficient on urban population density in 800 is negative and 
marginally significant. The strength of the effect of the rate of Reconquest on current 
development is illustrated in Figure 2 by a scatter plot of the two variables, after 
conditioning on the set of controls included in column 1. The partial R-square of the rate of 
Reconquest is 36% in this baseline specification. It is remarkable that an indicator 
measuring a historical event that occurred many centuries ago has such a large explanatory 
power on current income. 
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A typical concern of empirical analyses with a limited number of observations is the 
possibility that a few extreme cases drive the results. Columns 2-6 in Table 3 show that our 
findings are robust to removing outliers detected by the following procedures: leverage, 
standardized residuals, studentized residuals, Cook’s distance, DFITS, Welsch distance, 
and DF-Beta. Likewise, the effect of the Reconquest remains unchanged when the northern 
provinces forming the core of initial Christian outposts, for which the reconquered area was 
assumed to be zero, are excluded from the analysis (column 7). Another potential concern 
is the presence of spatial correlation, which may reduce the true precision of the effect. We 
have checked that the statistical significance of the coefficient on the rate of Reconquest is 
not reduced when using standard errors corrected for spatial dependence (i.e., Conley 
(1999) standard errors). Finally, the inclusion of the geographic coordinates (latitude and 
longitude) in the baseline specification does not eliminate the effect of the Reconquest. 
Notably, the effect remains statistically highly significant even when including a higher-
order (cubic) latitude/longitude polynomial.20 
 [Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 about here] 
V. Sensitivity analysis 
A. Municipality-level Analysis 
Although the relationship between the rate of Reconquest and current GDP appears robust 
to the inclusion of many geographic and historical controls, as well as to the removal of 
outliers, a possible objection is that some unobservable province-level characteristics are 
driving this result. One way to address this concern is to conduct the analysis at a finer 
level, namely, using municipality data, and test whether the results hold even when 
conditional upon province-specific fixed effects. This test is quite strong, and allows us to 
exploit within-province variation in the conditions surrounding the Reconquest. The 
inclusion of such powerful fixed effects enables us to account for any systematic and 
structural particularities related to the history of each province, which cannot be controlled 
                                                 
20 These unreported results are available in the unpublished appendix. 
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explicitly in a province-level analysis. For this exercise, we create a dataset of more than 
8,000 municipalities in Spain. We impute to each municipality the rate of Reconquest 
corresponding to the Reconquest phase to which the municipality belongs. As proxies for 
income at local level, we use current data for average socioeconomic conditions, average 
number of vehicles per household, and labor force activity rate, which appear clearly linked 
to economic development. This is corroborated by the existence of a high correlation with 
GDP per capita at provincial level (the correlation is 0.81 with average socioeconomic 
condition, 0.54 with average number of vehicles per household, and 0.73 with labor force 
activity rate). 
Table 4 presents the results with standard errors clustered at provincial level in order to 
consider spatial correlation, which can be substantial in this municipality-level analysis. All 
regressions include province dummies. Columns 1, 3 and 5 show that the rate of 
Reconquest appears negatively associated with the three proxies for local economic 
development, at least at the 5% significance level after incorporating the municipalities’ 
total population to control for differences in municipal size, latitude, and geographic factors 
related to transportation costs, such as distance to Madrid, distance to the coast, and 
distance to the nearest provincial capital (in linear and square form), together with a 
provincial capital dummy. In columns 2, 4 and 6, we extend the control set to incorporate 
additional variables for the municipalities’ climate, geography and topography. These 
include altitude, annual average temperature, annual rainfall, and seven dimensions 
measuring soil quality (nutrient availability and retention capacity, rooting capacity, oxygen 
availability to roots, excess salts, toxicity, and workability).21 It is worth noting that the 
baseline effect of the Reconquest remains statistically significant in all cases. This 
alleviates our concern that unobserved heterogeneity at provincial level might be the 
driving force behind the significant effect the Reconquest has had on current development 
in the province-level analysis. 
                                                 
21 The inclusion of all these controls together, along with the province-level fixed effects, is particularly 
important here. This is because with only 50 observations in the province-level analysis, we could not control 
for all the individual regressors together, since the degrees of freedom would dramatically fall. Instead, we 
opted for including in the same specification only those regressors that were found individually significant. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
B. Alternative Indicators of the Reconquest 
Thus far, we have reported the existence of a strong and robust negative effect of the 
Reconquest on current income. However, a further concern about our previous results is 
that they hinge on a particular indicator of the Reconquest. To address this concern, in the 
first place, we check that our results are robust to the use of an alternative indicator of the 
rate of Reconquest, which divides this historical process in stages of the same duration. 
More specifically, provinces are classified according to the century in which they were 
reconquered. As in the construction of the baseline Reconquest indicator, the territory that 
was not occupied by the Muslims is assigned a reconquered area equal to zero. For each 
century, we compute the total land area reconquered in that period, differentiating between 
the areas conquered by Castile and Aragon. Then, the rate of Reconquest in a given 
province is estimated as the total land area that was reconquered in the century in which 
that province was reconquered. The results shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 are highly robust to 
the use of this alternative indicator (the detailed results are provided in Tables A9-A11 of 
the unpublished appendices). 
In the second place, with the same underlying argument used in the calculation of the rate 
of Reconquest, we create an indicator consisting of a dummy variable indicating whether 
the province was reconquered after the collapse of the Almohad Caliphate in 1212 
following the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. This military victory by the Christian armies 
enabled them to conquer a vast territory in a short period of time. The rapid advance of the 
Christian frontier made the task of repopulation difficult and demanding, giving rise to a 
type of colonization in which the nobility and military orders played a predominant role in 
the occupation and defense of the new territories, with negative consequences for long-term 
economic development. 
Table 5 replicates regressions in Table 3 using this alternative indicator of the Reconquest 
called post-1212 conquest. The coefficient on post-1212 conquest is negative and 
statistically highly significant in all the columns. The magnitude of the effect is also 
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economically important in this case. Column 1 indicates that, conditional upon the controls 
included in the regression, the provinces conquered after 1212 are 24% poorer (e-0.274 – 1 ≈ 
–0.24). Thus, according to this result, the large frontier expansion recorded after 1212 led to 
negative long-term outcomes across today’s Spanish provinces.22 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
C. Falsification Test 
This section conducts a falsification exercise to show that the rate of Reconquest is not 
negatively related to the level of economic development in the pre-Reconquest era. A main 
threat to the validity of our analysis is the possibility that areas conquered faster were 
initially poorer, which could have facilitated a rapid conquest. If those areas conquered 
faster were worse off even before the Reconquest, then the observed relationship between 
the rate of Reconquest and current income may be driven by the territories’ intrinsic 
characteristics, rather than by the type of colonization conducted by Christians. However, it 
is very unlikely that the rate of Reconquest hinged on the territories’ economic 
development, since the pace of the advance of the Christian frontier was arguably caused 
mainly by the relative military weakness of the Muslim territory in each period. Therefore, 
the rate of Reconquest was the consequence of an exogenous factor with respect to the 
territories’ economic potential. 
Our aim is to verify that our indicator of the Reconquest does not have a statistically 
significant negative association with economic development and other outcome variables 
before the Reconquest. We measure pre-Reconquest development primarily through city 
population and urban population density in 800, which is the earliest year for which urban 
population data are available. Given that the Reconquest had hardly begun at that time, it 
serves our purpose. We also consider additional outcome indicators related to pre-
Reconquest development. These include years since the transition to agriculture, ancient 
                                                 
22 We also replicated all the regressions in Tables 1 and 2, finding that the coefficient on post-1212 conquest 
was always negative and statistically significant. These unreported results are available in Tables A7-A8 of 
the unpublished appendix. 
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(pre-medieval) settlements over surface area, Roman road density (total roads and main 
roads), the ratio of the number of locations where imperial coinage was found to surface 
area, Roman villas over surface area, and density of bishoprics circa 600. 
To assess whether these variables can be used as plausible measures of early 
development, we look at their correlation with an indicator of land suitability for agriculture 
–the percentage of agricultural area in 1900–, since pre-industrial prosperity is commonly 
considered to be related to soil fertility and, more specifically, to agricultural land potential. 
Remarkably, all the indicators –except for years since the transition to agriculture– are 
positively correlated with the percentage of agricultural area. In the case of city population 
and the density of urban population in 800, Roman road density –total and main roads–, 
presence of imperial Roman coinage, and Roman villas, correlations are statistically 
significant.23 Very similar correlations follow when we employ the variable percentage of 
arable land in 1962 as a measure of land suitability for agriculture. These results indicate 
that most indicators of pre-Reconquest development reveal expected relationships with 
agricultural land potential, which makes us more confident about their reliability. 
Table 6 provides the results on the relationship between the rate of Reconquest and early 
development. It is worth noting that the rate of Reconquest is not negatively associated with 
any of the measures of early economic development.24 The above findings suggest that the 
effect of the Reconquest does not merely represent the perpetuation of differences in 
economic development that already existed before the Reconquest, or mean that provinces 
conquered more rapidly started off at a disadvantage or were intrinsically poorer. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
                                                 
23 For total Roman road density, the coefficient of correlation is significant at the 10.7% level. Detailed results 
are provided in the unpublished appendix. 
24 This analysis omits those control variables that are meaningless when the dependent variable is a measure 
of pre-Reconquest development, namely, Crown of Aragon, Madrid, and border with Portugal. Nevertheless, 
we have confirmed that the findings are the same when they are included. For obvious reasons, urban 
population density in 800 was also excluded from the set of controls. We also confirmed that the indicator of 
post-1212 conquest is not related to pre-Reconquest economic development either. These unreported results 
are available in Tables A14-A15 of the unpublished appendix. 
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VI. The Timing of the Effect of the Reconquest 
The above results confirm the strong and robust negative effect that the Reconquest has 
had on current per capita income. A question that requires further study is when this effect 
actually took place. This is a key issue because it provides clues about the nature and causes 
of the effect. On the one hand, if our findings were due to –for example– some geographic 
confounding factor, the effect of the Reconquest would probably be visible at all times.25 
On the other hand, the analysis of the timing of the effect is useful for considering the 
mechanisms at work. For example, if the main implications of the rapid advance of the 
Christian frontier were related to the destruction of Muslim technologies or to a lack of 
agglomeration economies due to low population density, the negative effect should have 
become apparent soon after the Reconquest. 
Table 7 presents estimates of the effect of the Reconquest at different moments in time: 
1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005. We select 1860 as our first point in time because there are no 
data on GDP for Spain’s provinces before that date.26 The regression results shown in Panel 
A are appealing because they do not reveal a simple direct effect of the Reconquest on 
economic development. As shown in column 1, the coefficient on rate of Reconquest is 
insignificant in 1860, around the time when Spain entered the industrialization phase 
(Pascual and Sudriá 2002; Rosés 2006).27 This contrasts with the negative and highly 
significant coefficient found since then (columns 2-4). We find similar results when log 
GDP per capita is replaced by log industrial production per capita, which may be more 
closely related to industrialization (columns 5-8). Panel B provides the standardized effect 
of rate of Reconquest (i.e., the coefficient multiplied by the standard deviation of rate of 
                                                 
25 In this regard, the evidence presented so far dismisses such a possibility, since the effect is quite robust to 
many geographic controls, and the rate of Reconquest is not related to indicators of early development. 
26 There is also the possibility of using urbanization rate as a proxy for economic development for previous 
periods. However, we prefer not to use this variable since it does not accurately measure the level of 
economic development at the subnational level for the case of Spain. This is because there are many densely 
populated agro-towns distributed across the southern part of Spain that accumulate a large number of landless 
peasants, but have very few features consistent with high levels of economic development (Reher 1990). 
27 The fact that Spain began its industrialization around 1860 is well reflected in the evolution of the railway 
network, which grew from less than 400 kilometers in 1855 to 5,076 kilometers in 1866 (Pascual and Sudriá 
2002). 
24 
 
Reconquest and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable). Focusing on 
GDP per capita, we observe that the negative effect of the Reconquest does not diminish 
over time, which reflects a high degree of persistence.28 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 shows the effect of the Reconquest is clearly linked to industrialization. We 
pursue this question further by taking into account that the exact timing of industrialization 
in Spain may be endogenous. Thus, we complement the previous analysis with some panel 
regressions that use industrialization in the UK and the US (Mitchell 2007a, b) as a measure 
of the opportunity to industrialize, following the insights from Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2002, pp. 1274-1275). The panel data specification is as follows: 
yit= αi + θt + δ · Reconquesti x Industrializationt + νit              (2) 
where yit is either provincial GDP per capita or industrial output per capita expressed in 
relative terms with respect to the national average at date t (1860, 1930, 1971, and 2005). αi 
is a set of province-level dummies and θt stands for a set of time dummies. Reconquesti 
represents the rate of Reconquest in province i and Industrializationt denotes either UK 
industrial output or US industrial output at date t. The coefficient of interest is δ on the 
interaction between rate of Reconquest and industrialization, which should be negative and 
statistically significant. Table 8 presents the panel regressions for the cases in which the 
dependent variable is relative GDP per capita and relative industrial output per capita. It is 
worth stressing that the interaction term δ appears negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level in all cases, which is consistent with the results reported in Table 7. The 
magnitude of the coefficient of interest is found to be substantially larger (in absolute 
terms) in the specifications that use industrial output per capita as the dependent variable. 
This can be explained to the extent that industrial output is more closely related to 
industrialization than GDP. In sum, these results indicate that the effect of the Reconquest 
                                                 
28 Table A16 of the unpublished appendix shows a very similar pattern in the timing of the effect when post-
1212 conquest is used as an alternative indicator of the Reconquest. 
25 
 
on income occurred during industrialization, and has persisted since then. The remainder of 
the paper sets out to explain these findings. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
VII. Mechanisms at work 
In Section 2, we argued that the rate of Reconquest was a crucial factor affecting the 
outcome of the repopulation process. A rapid rate is generally associated with imperfect 
colonization, with negative consequences for each region’s subsequent development. The 
rapid advance of the Christian frontier made the task of repopulation more difficult and 
demanding, which originated several problems, such as scarcity of settlers and resources, 
defense requirements for vast territories, and the governance of a large conquered Muslim 
population. What follows describes the potential channels that may help explain the effect 
of the Reconquest on current development, as well as the way they can be measured. We 
also discuss the consistency of each alternative explanation with the observed timing of the 
effect. 
A. Economic and Political Power Concentration 
Spanish historiography suggests that two key outcomes of the repopulation process were 
how land was distributed and who held political power. This constitutes our main 
hypothesis, and the argument deserves to be further developed. The rate of Reconquest 
affected the possibility that either individual settlers or the nobility and military orders 
gained control over the newly conquered territories. As historically documented, a greater 
area to be repopulated increased the likelihood that nobles and military orders were called 
upon to participate in the repopulation and defense of such vast territories. Consequently, a 
rapid frontier expansion favored an initial political equilibrium biased toward the nobility, 
which led to the concentration of political power –in the form of jurisdictional rights– and 
economic power –in the form of land– in the hands of this social group. 
The consequences of a high concentration of power by the nobility were pervasive. 
Jurisdictional rights provided the landowning nobility with the legal and political apparatus 
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that afforded them de jure political power over the broad mass of the population. This 
meant the landless peasantry became attached to the nobles’ lands, and the judiciary and 
local council were controlled by the nobility. They used their economic and political power 
to run de facto extractive institutions and control local government to exploit the peasantry 
through such mechanisms as severe restrictions on land and grain transactions, labor 
contracts with caps on agricultural wages, land tenure systems implying short-term leases 
whose conditions were reviewed annually, and the obligation to use the nobles’ mill to 
grind the grain.29 In this context, it is evident that the political equilibrium clearly favored 
the landed nobility at the expense of the agricultural proletariat on large estates, who were 
the majority of the population in the regions of southern Spain (Brenan 1943; Dominguez-
Ortiz 1955). This created a society characterized by a high level of social and political 
inequality.  
The picture of the concentration of economic and political power arising from the 
Reconquest persisted over time, and even became accentuated, in a clear process of path 
dependence. Several factors explain this process of extraordinary persistence. First, the 
decline in population after the Christian conquest due to migrations, the expulsion of the 
Muslim population, and other circumstances, such as epidemics, favored the establishment 
and consolidation of a type of extensive agriculture based on large estates (Malefakis 
1970). Second, the landed nobility used their political power to illegally usurp lands and 
monopolize unappropriated or common lands (Vicens Vives 1969; Cabrera Muñoz 1989). 
Third, the balance of political power in favor of power groups gave rise to such inefficient 
institutions as the creation of entailed estates protected by law (mayorazgos) and other 
regulations by which land became non-conveyable. Fourth, jurisdictional rights were 
hereditary, thereby guaranteeing the persistence in the concentration of de jure political 
power in the hands of the nobility. The liberal reforms of the nineteenth century derogated 
                                                 
29 Nobles also exploited monopoly rights over other manufacturing activities, such as public ovens, 
butcheries, forges, and wineries, or services such as shops, taverns and potteries (Cabrera Muñoz 2006). In 
many instances, nobles also had the right of taxation at local level and adjudicated over property disputes, 
punishing minor crimes and even imposing death sentences for capital crimes (Dominguez-Ortiz 1955; Herr 
1958; Dewald 2004). 
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the legal apparatus of the Old Regime, but in contrast to what happened in other European 
countries like France, they failed to derogate nobles’ landownership and hence change the 
balance of power in society (García-Ormaechea 2002). Finally, the process of disentailment 
of communal and ecclesiastical landownership known as desamortización aggravated the 
pattern of land concentration in a few hands because land was bought up by the rich, the 
bourgeoisie, and nobles (Brenan 1943; Carrión 1975; Malefakis 1970). 
The role of economic and political power concentration as mechanisms for explaining the 
effect of the Reconquest on income appears fairly consistent with the fact that this effect 
became apparent during industrialization. In line with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2002), we argue that pervasive forms of concentrating economic and political power act as 
severe impediments to the requirements for modern economic growth by excluding broad 
segments of the population from participating in economic activity. Nevertheless, from the 
point of view of the generation of wealth regardless of its distribution, when the main sector 
of activity is agriculture, economic and political inequality may not impair aggregate 
production. In pre-industrial times, other factors such as soil fertility or environmental 
suitability may have been more important for production. In this sense, some of the 
provinces with higher concentrations of economic and political power are among the most 
fertile lands in Spain, and until the onset of industrialization were also among the 
wealthiest.30 However, when the opportunity to industrialize arrives, the participation of 
broad segments of the population in economic activity is a fundamental factor for 
industrialization to succeed. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) and Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2002) emphasize the importance of the population’s broad-based participation in 
economic activity, paying particular attention to the role played by new entrepreneurs, 
innovators, and middle-class citizens. Economic growth is viewed as the “cumulative 
impact of incremental advances made by individuals throughout the economy” (Engerman 
                                                 
30 For example, still in 1860, at the beginning of the industrialization period, Andalusia was the second 
wealthiest region, ahead of Catalonia and the Basque Country, with a level of GDP per capita about 36 
percentage points above the Spanish average. Yet just seventy years later, in 1930, Andalusia was among the 
poorest regions, with a level of GDP per capita of only 77% of the Spanish average (data from Rosés et al. 
2010). 
28 
 
and Sokoloff 2002, p. 84; Sokoloff and Khan 1990). In this regard, the adverse effect of the 
concentration of political power through the creation of extractive institutions appeared 
hand-in-hand with industrialization, since they “may become much more inappropriate 
with the arrival of new technologies” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, p. 1273). 
Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) also provide an interesting link by which economic 
power concentration –in particular, land inequality– may induce the landed elite to block 
education reforms, and thus, the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. This 
argument is particularly applicable to the Spanish case, given the large differences in land 
inequality across provinces. 
We measure political and economic power concentration with two indicators from the 
1797 population census: on the one hand, the percentage of villages and cities under 
seigneurial jurisdiction that includes both nobles and military orders, which aims to capture 
the de jure political power of the nobility;31 on the other, the percentage of landless workers 
over the agricultural active population, which is a proxy for the concentration of land in the 
hands of the nobles. The class of landless laborers, which can be traced back to the fifteenth 
century, was a by-product of the concentration of land in the hands of the nobility (Cabrera 
Muñoz 1989).32,33 
B. Other Potential Intervening Factors 
The rate of Reconquest could also affect other factors of relevance to economic 
development. A first candidate is population density. The rapid advance of the Christian 
frontier gave rise to sparsely populated territories due to a lack of manpower and settlers, 
                                                 
31 We proceed in this way because military orders were mostly composed of members of the nobility, with 
masters (maestres) and commanders usually forming part of the higher nobility (Vicens Vives 1969; Mestre-
Campi and Sabaté 1998; Alvarez-Palenzuela 2002). 
32 According to Cabrera Muñoz (1989) “From the 1460s onwards the existence of a large rural proletariat [in 
the Guadalquivir Valley] can be clearly documented. Indeed, use of the notarial records alone would suggest 
that those who actually worked the land were never, or hardly ever, the owners of it, the owners in effect 
being rentiers” (p. 480). 
33 No data on proxies for land concentration at provincial level are available before the end of the eighteenth 
century. From that moment on, the empirical evidence clearly indicates a high degree of persistence in land 
inequality, as reflected in the high correlation (0.81) existing between the percentage of landless workers in 
1797 and 1956.  
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which was aggravated by the eventual expulsion of the conquered population. Low 
population density affects economic development not only by facilitating the concentration 
of power in the hands of the nobility, but also through other channels, such as, for instance, 
technological progress à la Boserup or agglomeration economies.34 We control for this 
mechanism by using an indicator of past population density measured in 1594. 
A second important factor is the extent to which the preexisting Muslim population was 
respected and integrated into the Christian kingdoms. A rapid frontier expansion made it 
difficult to govern and integrate this population, as became apparent with the great mudejar 
revolt of 1264, which led to the expulsion of the Muslim population from the Guadalquivir 
Valley. In addition to creating problems of labor scarcity, the fate of the Muslim population 
had important implications due to their higher human capital, particularly concerning the 
level of agricultural technology.35 Moreover, the degree of assimilation of the Muslim 
population could also have cultural implications. To measure this factor, the best we can do 
is use an indicator of the proportion of Moorish ancestry in the current population of each 
province. Using an admixture approach based on binary and Y-STR haplotypes, Adams et 
al. (2008) were able to identify the genetic differentiation of the population of the Iberian 
Peninsula and the Balearic Islands, finding a relatively high mean proportion of ancestry 
from North Africa (10.6%). As opposed to the common expectation that a South-North 
gradient of North-African ancestry is followed, it is worth noting that the highest 
proportions of Moorish ancestry (greater than 20%) are found in Galicia and Northwest 
Castile, which contrast with the much lower proportions in Andalusia.36 
                                                 
34 By examining the interaction between plague, war and urbanization, Voigtländer and Voth (2013) show 
that high death rates lead to low population growth, high land-to-labor ratios, higher wages, and higher GDP 
per capita. 
35 al-Andalus, the unique Muslim domain in Western Europe, achieved by far the highest level of prosperity 
on the continent (Chejne 1999). Its economy was based on a developed and partially irrigated agriculture, a 
significant arts and crafts industry and flourishing trade. Furthermore, a monetary system was in place, 
contrasting with the primitive economy of the northern Christian kingdoms (Vicens Vives 1969, Glick 1979). 
36 It is also worth mentioning the marked differences between the western part of Spain, with a relatively high 
proportion, and the eastern part with a relatively low proportion. Adams et al. (2008) seek to explain these 
differences in the history of enforced relocation and expulsion of the Moorish population.  
30 
 
Another possible mechanism that may affect current levels of development is the degree 
of market fragmentation. Grafe (2012) points to the exceptionally high degree of market 
fragmentation observed in Spain over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the main 
obstacle to economic development. In addition, market fragmentation could be the 
consequence –at least in part– of accelerated colonization by, for instance, making it more 
difficult to maintain the pre-existing infrastructure network. We measure differences in the 
degree of market fragmentation across provinces by constructing an indicator of road 
density in 1760 at provincial level, with higher road density implying less fragmented 
markets. This indicator can also be used to test for possible differences in government 
investment in infrastructure across provinces. 
One might also assume that the Reconquest generated historical differences both in the 
political power of the Church and in religiosity across provinces, which might have had 
some effect on current development. To control for this factor, we employ two indicators 
measured in 1797: the percentage of villages and cities under Church jurisdiction, and the 
percentage of population that was a member of the clergy (both secular and regular). A 
related factor is the role played by the Inquisition, which was charged with preserving 
Catholic orthodoxy. Vidal-Robert (2014) shows that inquisitorial activity is negatively 
associated both with urbanization rates at regional level and population growth at municipal 
level. However, a lack of consistent data for constructing an indicator for the majority of 
the Spanish provinces has prevented us from empirically assessing the role of the 
Inquisition in mediating the effect of the Reconquest. 
A final mechanism that remains uncontrolled involves interregional migration, which is 
historically hard to measure. However, there may be reasons explaining why people do not 
move between regions to arbitrate the existing differences in economic development. One 
simple explanation may be found in Gennaioli et al. (2013), who develop a model in which 
there are frictions related to the limited supply of land and housing that prevent people from 
completely arbitrating away the differences in income. Besides, migration in our case 
would act against our identification strategy, since if income differences were swept away 
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because of interregional migration, we would no longer find an effect on current income 
differences, which would have vanished over time. 
The consistency between these alternative potential mechanisms and the observed timing 
of the effect of the Reconquest is theoretically less compelling than the case of the channel 
involving the concentration of economic and political power. Indeed, if the lack of 
agglomeration economies due to low population density, human capital depreciation 
derived from the expulsion of the Muslims, market fragmentation, and differences in 
religiosity were relevant factors explaining the effect of the Reconquest, the timing of the 
effect should have been much earlier, instead of much later during industrialization. 
C. Empirical Analysis 
Although the timing of the effect of the Reconquest provides some clues about the 
empirical validity of the proposed channels, Table 9 analyzes this question more 
systematically. Following Bruhn and Gallego (2012), we regress each one of the channels 
considered on the rate of Reconquest and the basic set of controls. As a benchmark, 
columns 1 and 2 reproduce the results from our baseline specification (using per capita 
income as the dependent variable). Panel A reports the estimated coefficients on all the 
explanatory variables, while Panel B displays the standardized coefficient on rate of 
Reconquest. Three criteria are considered to evaluate each potential mechanism: a) the 
statistical significance of the coefficient on rate of Reconquest; b) whether the sign is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction; and c) the magnitude of the effect. 
It is worth noting that the results using the proxies for economic and political power 
concentration (i.e., the percentage of landless workers and the percentage of villages under 
seigniorial jurisdiction) are fully consistent with the correlation between rate of Reconquest 
and current income. The coefficient on rate of Reconquest is always statistically significant, 
with its negative sign being consistent with theoretical predictions, and the magnitude of 
the effect is large (columns 3–6). Panel B shows that the standardized effect on landless 
workers is greater than that in the baseline specification, while that on seigniorial 
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jurisdiction is somewhat lower. According to these results, both factors seem to be relevant 
mechanisms explaining the long-term consequences of the Reconquest. 
Regarding population density, the coefficient on rate of Reconquest is insignificant in the 
regression without controls, while it becomes statistically highly significant when control 
variables are included. The coefficient has an expected negative sign, and the effect is 
economically important (columns 7–8). Population density can thus be considered a 
potential channel for the effect of the Reconquest. However, an empirical problem here is 
that we cannot distinguish which part of the effect of population density works through 
economic and political power concentration, or through other mechanisms such as 
agglomeration economies. This evidence does not therefore allow us to know whether 
population density affects economic development beyond its effect on economic and 
political inequality. 
Columns 9–12 show that the coefficient on rate of Reconquest is statistically insignificant 
when the dependent variable is either Moorish ancestry or road density. With the evidence 
at hand, this suggests that the degree of integration of the Muslim population and market 
fragmentation are not relevant mechanisms explaining the long-term economic 
consequences of the Reconquest. As regards the two indicators related to the role of the 
Church and religion (columns 13-16), the coefficient on rate of Reconquest is only 
statistically significant in the case of villages under Church jurisdiction. However, when the 
set of control variables is included the statistical significance is greatly reduced, and most 
importantly, the sign is contrary to predictions. This is because a rapid rate of Reconquest is 
expected to lead to more Church jurisdictions, which would bring about lower GDP per 
capita (implying a positive coefficient on rate of Reconquest). 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
D. Outcome Indicators at the Onset of Industrialization 
The evidence presented in this section largely supports the view that the concentration of 
economic and political power plays a central role in explaining the Reconquest’s effect and 
33 
 
why it became apparent during the era of industrialization. Table 10 provides additional 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis by focusing on the decisive moment in which 
Spain began industrializing. It shows that although the Reconquest’s impact on income was 
not yet apparent in 1860, some of the fundamentals of modern economic growth were 
already undermined at the onset of the industrialization period. Our dependent variables are 
a number of factors that are relevant for economic growth, all measured in the 1860s. They 
are two indicators related to education (literacy rate and school enrollment), two related to 
health (infant mortality and life expectancy), two associated with political participation 
(percentage of electors and voters), and two indicators related to social conflict (criminality 
and convicts). According to our view, we expect the rate of Reconquest –working through 
economic and political inequality– to lead to lower human capital (negatively affecting 
education and health), lower political participation, and higher social conflict.37 This is 
precisely what we observe in columns 1–8 in Table 10.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
The last two columns perform a falsification test by analyzing the relationship between, 
on the one hand, the rate of Reconquest and, on the other, agricultural productivity and 
agriculture’s share of GDP (both measured in 1860). If the coefficient on rate of 
Reconquest is negative and statistically significant, particularly in the case of agricultural 
productivity, it may suggest that provinces corresponding to areas that were conquered 
faster have poorer land or a less favorable climate, which would cast doubts on our 
conclusions. By contrast, if the coefficient is positive and significant in both cases, it will 
imply that those same provinces have a competitive advantage in agriculture and are 
specialized in this sector, which would also add confusion to our hypothesis about 
economic and political inequality as one of the main channels explaining the effect of the 
Reconquest. The results shown in columns 9 and 10 are again consistent with a genuine 
effect of the Reconquest, as well as with the empirical validity of the power concentration 
                                                 
37 Regarding political participation, it is important to note that at that time a limited suffrage system based on 
capacity and fiscal criteria was in place. 
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hypothesis. All in all, the evidence provided in Table 10 indicates that although in 1860 
there was not yet a statistically significant relationship between rate of Reconquest and 
income, the conditions were already created for the subsequent failure to industrialize. 
VIII. Conclusions 
The legacy of history appears particularly pervasive in the case of Spain. This paper 
shows the Reconquest in the Middle Ages to have been a major historical process shaping 
the distribution of regional income. The rate of Reconquest, which captures the magnitude 
of the colonization effort required in the period when each one of what are now today’s 
provinces was conquered by the Christians, has a robust and strong negative effect on 
current income. Our results are robust to controlling for historical controls and a wide array 
of climatic, geographic and natural resource endowments that account for simple and 
sophisticated versions of the geography hypothesis. Of particular interest is the lack of a 
significant effect due to differences in land suitability for plantation crops featuring 
economies of scale in production. Moreover, the effect of the rate of Reconquest survive 
the inclusion of latitude, indicating that we are not simply capturing the fact that regions in 
the South are poorer. The results also remain unaltered when employing an alternative 
indicator of the Reconquest, measuring whether the province was conquered after 1212. A 
municipality-level analysis that includes province-level fixed effects also provides evidence 
supporting the existence of a negative effect of the rate of Reconquest on economic 
development. In addition, a number of falsification tests indicate that the rate of Reconquest 
is not associated with indicators of pre-Reconquest economic development. 
We argue that a rapid rate of Reconquest led to imperfect colonization, mainly 
characterized by a high concentration of power in a few hands. The evidence supports the 
view that a fast frontier expansion favored a political equilibrium biased toward the military 
elite (i.e., the nobility), which generated a high concentration of economic and political 
power, thus creating the conditions that led to the exclusion of large segments of the 
population from participating in the economic opportunities that opened up with the arrival 
of industrialization. The result was that provinces featuring an unequal distribution of 
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economic and political power fell behind during the industrialization period. Thus, the 
Reconquest set in motion processes that generated persistent inequality, constituting a 
severe impediment to the requirements for modern economic growth, which is based on 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and the participation in economic activity of broad segments 
of the population. 
Our results contribute to the novel literature on the political-economic effects of frontier 
expansions in that the existence of a large frontier that needs to be occupied and defended 
from the enemy may lead to a shift in the balance of power toward dominant groups, which 
may create the conditions for an inegalitarian society, with negative consequences for long-
term development. This study of the Spanish Reconquest is also appealing from the point of 
view of the literature on colonialism, because it gives clues about the colonization of the 
New World. When Spain colonized Central and South America in the sixteenth century, it 
had the long experience gained in the Reconquest. The policy of distributing economic 
power in the form of large estates, as well as of political power in the form of feudal rights, 
as applied in Spain since the mid-eleventh century (becoming widespread as of the 
thirteenth century) is a foretaste of what would later be implemented in the New World. 
Finally, a question that deserves further research is why the effect of the Reconquest 
resulting from the pattern of colonization of the conquered lands is so persistent, even 
though today some sources of this problem are no longer present. The early obstruction of 
industrialization may have long-lasting consequences. Historical, economic, and political 
inequality may have affected the initial paths of industrialization and development and, 
once launched, different economic forces (e.g., increasing returns) reproduce the initial 
divergence. In addition, many social and cultural patterns developed in the past due to a 
high concentration of economic and political power may still persist today. 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, Daron, Maria Angelica Bautista, Pablo Querubin, and James A. Robinson. 
2008. “Economic and Political Inequality in Development: The Case of Cundinamarca, 
36 
 
Colombia.” In Institutions and Economic Performance, edited by Elhanan Helpman. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2011a. “The 
Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution”. American Economic Review 
101: 3286–3307 
Acemoglu, Daron, Tarek A. Hassan, and James A. Robinson. 2011b. “Social Structure and 
Development: A Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126: 
895-946. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 91: 
1369–1401. 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: 
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1231-1294. 
Adams, Susan M., et al. 2008. “The Genetic Legacy of Religious Diversity and Intolerance: 
Paternal Lineages of Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula.” The 
American Journal of Human Genetics 83: 725-736. 
Alvarez-Palenzuela, Vicente A. 2002. “Enrique, Infante de Aragón, Maestre de Santiago.” 
Medievalismo: Revista de la Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales 12 (12): 37-89. 
Alsan, Marcella. 2014. “The Effect of the Tse Tse Fly on African Development”. American 
Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Angeles, Luis. 2007. “Income Inequality and Colonialism”, European Economic Review 
51(5), 1155-1176. 
Angeles, L. and Neanidis, K. C. 2009. “Aid effectiveness: the role of the local elite.” 
Journal of Development Economics, vol. 90, pp. 120-134. 
Ashraf, Quamrul, and Galor Oded. 2013. “The 'Out of Africa' Hypothesis, Human Genetic 
Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development”. American Economic Review 103: 1-
46. 
37 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions, and Economic 
Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India.” American Economic 
Review 95: 1190-1213. 
Bairoch, Paul. 1988. Cities and Economic Development: From the Dawn of History to the 
Present. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Baten, Joerg, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2008. “Book Production and the Onset of Modern 
Economic Growth”. Journal of Economic Growth 13: 217–235. 
Bockstette,Valeri, Areendam Chanda, and Louis Putterman. 2002. “States and Markets: the 
Advantage of an Early Start”. Journal of Economic Growth 7: 347–369. 
Brenan, Geral. 1943. The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political 
Background of the Spanish Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bruhn, Miriam, and Francisco A. Gallego. 2012. “Good, bad, and ugly colonial activities: 
Do they matter for economic development?” Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (2): 
433-461. 
Burns, Robert I. 1989. “The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages”. In Medieval 
Frontier Societies, edited by Robert Bartlett and Angus Mackay, pp. 307-30. Clarendon 
Press: Oxford. 
Cabrera Muñoz, Emilio. 1989. “The medieval Origins of the Great Landed Estates of the 
Guadalquivir Valley”. Economic History Review 42 (4): 465-483. 
Cabrera Muñoz, Emilio. 2006. “Feudalismo y Señoríos en Andalucía (Siglos XIII al XV).” 
In Historia de Andalucía IV: El Nacimiento de Andalucía, pp. 106-134, edited by Manuel 
González Jiménez. Planeta Editorial: Barcelona. 
Carrión, Pascual. 1975. Los Latifundios en España. Su importancia, Origen. Consecuencias 
y Solución. Barcelona: Ariel. 
Casado Alonso, Hilario. 2002. “La Economía en las Españas Medievales (c. 1000 – c. 
1450).” In Historia económica de España: siglos X-XX, edited by Comín, Francisco, Mauro 
Hernández and Enrique Llopis, Chapter 1, 13-50. Barcelona: Crítica, D.L. 
Chejne, Anwar G. 1999. Historia de España Musulmana. Madrid: Cátedra, D.L.  
38 
 
Conley, T. 1999. “GMM Estimation with Cross Sectional Dependence.” Journal of 
Econometrics, 92, 1-45. 
Cook, Justin C. 2014. “The Role of Lactase Persistence in Precolonial Development.” 
Journal of Economic Growth 19: 369-406. 
Dell, Melissa. 2010. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita”. Econometrica 78 (6): 
1863-1903. 
de Vries, Jan. 1976. The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Dewald, Jonathan, 2004. Europe 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World. 
Charles Scribner's Sons: New York. 
Domínguez-Ortiz, Antonio. 1955. La Sociedad Española en el Siglo XVIII. Madrid: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Balmes de Sociología. 
Easterly, William, and Ross Levine. 2003. “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments 
Influence Economic Development”. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 3–39. 
Easterly, W., Levine, R., 2014. “The European Origins of Economic Development”. 
Mimeograph. 
Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 1997. “Factor Endowments, Institutions, 
and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies.” In How Latin America 
Fell Behind, edited by Stephen Haber, 260–304. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2000. “Institutions, Factor Endowments, 
and Paths of Development in the New World.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3): 
217–232. 
Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2002. “Factor Endowments, Inequality, 
and Paths of Development among New World Economies.” Economia 3(1): 41–109. 
FAO/IIASA. 2010. Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0). FAO, Rome, Italy and 
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Fenske, James (2013). “Does Land Abundance Explain African Institutions?” Economic 
Journal, 123 (573), 1363-1390. 
39 
 
Fenske, James. 2014. “Ecology, Trade and States in Precolonial Africa.” Journal of 
European Economic Association, 12 (3): 612-640. 
Feyrer, James, and Bruce Sacerdote. 2009. “Colonialism and Modern Income: Islands as 
Natural Experiments.” Review of Economics and Statistics 91(2): 245–262. 
Forey, Alan J. 1984. “The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Centuries”. Traditio 40: 197-234. 
Frankema, Ewout. 2010. “The Colonial Roots of Land Inequality: Geography, Factor 
Endowments, or Institutions?” Economic History Review 63 (2): 418–451. 
Gallego, F.A., 2010. “Historical Origins of Schooling: The Role of Democracy and 
Political Decentralization”. Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (2), 228-243. 
Gallup, John L, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger. 1999. “Geography and 
Economic Development.” International Regional Science Review 22: 179–232. 
Galor, Oded, Omer Moav, and Dietrich Vollrath. 2009. “Inequality in Land Ownership, the 
Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions and the Great Divergence.” Review of 
Economic Studies 76: 143-179. 
García-Jimeno, Camilo, and James A. Robinson (2011). “The Myth of the Frontier.” In: 
Dora L. Costa and Naomi R. Lamoreaux (Eds.), Understanding Long-Run Economic 
Growth. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 49-88. 
García-Ormaechea, Rafael. 2002. Supervivencias Feudales en España. Estudio de 
Legislación y Jurisprudencia sobre Señoríos. Pamplona: Urgoiti Editores. 
Gennaioli, Nicola, and Ilia Rainer. 2007. “The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization 
in Africa.” Journal of Economic Growth 12 (3), 185-234. 
Gennaioli, Nicola, Rafael Laporta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, Andrei. 2013. 
“Human Capital and Regional Development.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (1): 
105-164. 
Glick, Thomas F. 1979. Islamic and Christian Spain in the early Middle Ages. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
40 
 
González Jiménez, Manuel. 2006. Orígenes de la Andalucía Cristiana: La Repoblación de 
Andalucía en el Siglo XIII, in Historia de Andalucía II: La Andalucía Dividida (1301-
1350), edited by Manuel González Jiménez and José Enrique López de Coca Castañer, pp. 
151-182, Editorial Planeta: Barcelona. 
González Jiménez, Manuel. 1989. Frontier and Settlement in the Kingdom of Castile 
(1085-1350). In Medieval Frontier Societies, edited by Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay, 
pp. 49-74. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Grafe, Regina. 2012. Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650-
1800. Princeton University Press: Princeton.  
Guichard, Pierre. 2002. De la Expansión Árabe a la Reconquista: Esplendor y Fragilidad 
de Al-Andalus. Granada: Ed. Fundación El Legado Andalusí. 
Hennessy, C. Alistair M. (1978). The Frontier in Latin American History. London: Edward 
Arnold. 
Herr, Richard. 1958. The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Iyer, Lakshmi. 2010. “Direct versus indirect colonial rule in India: Long-term 
consequences.” Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (4): 693-713. 
Malefakis, Edward. 1970. Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain. Origins of 
the Civil War. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Mestre-Campi, Jesús, and Flocel Sabaté. 1998. Atlas de la “Reconquista”. La Frontera 
Peninsular entre los Siglos VIII y XV. Barcelona: Ediciones Península. 
Mitchell, Brian R. 2007a. International Historical Statistics. Europe, 1750-2005. Palgrave: 
Hampshire. 
Mitchell, Brian R. 2007b. International Historical Statistics. The Americas, 1750-2005. 
Palgrave: Hampshire. 
Naritomi, Joana, Rodrigo R. Soares, and Juliano L. Assunçao. 2012. “Institutional 
Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil.” Journal of Economic History 72 (2): 
393-422. 
41 
 
Nunn, Nathan. 2014. “Historical Development,” In: Handbook of Economic Growth. Vol. 
2. Edited by Philippe Aghion and Peter Durlauf, North-Holland, forthcoming. 
López-González, Clemente, Elena Postigo Castellano, and José Ignacio Ruiz Rodríguez. 
1989. “Las Ordenes Militares Castellanas en la Época Moderna: Una Aproximación 
Cartográfica” in Las Ordenes Militares en el Mediterráneo Occidental. Siglos XIII-XVIII, 
edited by Manuel Espadas Burgos and Didier Ozanam, pp. 291-303. Casa de Velázquez, 
Instituto de Estudios Manchegos. Imprenta Taravilla: Toledo. 
Olsson, Ola, and Christopher Paik. 2013. “A Western Reversal since the Neolithic? The 
Long-run Impact of Early Agriculture.” Working Paper, Gothenburg University. 
Oto-Peralías, Daniel, and Diego Romero-Ávila. 2014. “The Persistent Effects of Historical 
Borders and the Rise of Inequality. The Case of the Frontier of Granada”. Working Paper, 
Pablo de Olavide University. 
Pascual, Pere, and Sudriá, Carles. 2002. “El Difícil Arranque de la Industrialización.” In 
Historia económica de España: Siglos X-XX, edited by Comín, Francisco, Mauro 
Hernández y Enrique Llopis, Chapter 6, 203-241. Barcelona: Crítica, D.L. 
Pinhasi, Ron, Joaquim Fort, and Albert J. Ammerman (2005) “Tracing the Origins and 
Spread of Agriculture in Europe”. PLOS Biology 3(12): 2220-2228. 
Reher, David-Sven. 1990. Town and Country in Pre-industrial Spain. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rosés, Joan R. 2006. “La Primera Etapa de la Industrialización.” In: Historia Económica de 
España, edited by Agustín Gonzalez Enciso and Juan M. Matés Barco, Chapter 7, 185-207. 
Barcelona: Ariel. 
Rosés, Joan R., Julio Martínez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado. 2010. “The Upswing of 
Regional Income Inequality in Spain (1860–1930)”. Explorations in Economic History 47: 
244–257. 
Ruiz-Maya, Luis. 1979. “Sobre el Origen Histórico de la Concentración de la Tierra: una 
Aproximación Estadística.” Agricultura y Sociedad 10: 9-103. 
Sánchez Albornoz, Claudio. 1932. La Reforma Agraria ante la Historia. Madrid: 
Tipografía de Archivos. 
42 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2003. “Institutions don’t Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on per Capita 
Income”, NBER Working Paper. No. 9490. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Sobrequés. 1972. “La Baja Edad Media Peninsular.” In Historia de España y América 
Social y Económica edited by J. Vicens-Vives. Barcelona: Ediciones Vicens-Vives. 
Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and B. Zorina Khan. 1990. “The Democratization of Invention 
during Early Industrialization: Evidence from the United States, 1790–1846.” Journal of 
Economic History 50 (June): 363–78. 
Spolaore, Enrico and Roman Wacziarg. 2013. “How Deep Are the Roots of Economic 
Development?” Journal of Economic Literature 51 (2): 325-369. 
Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1920. The Frontier in American History. New York: H. Holt 
and Co. 
Vicens Vives, Jaime. 1969. An Economic History of Spain. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Vidal Robert, Jordi. 2014. “Long-run Effects of the Spanish Inquisition”, CAGE Online 
Working Paper No. 192, Warwick University. 
Voigtländer, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2013. “The Three Horsemen of Riches: 
Plague, War, and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe.” Review of Economic Studies 80: 
774-881. 
43 
 
TABLES 
 
 
 
 
W
oo
de
d 
st
ep
pe
 (%
 
ar
ea
)
Y
ea
rs
 si
nc
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 to
 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
R
om
an
 
ro
ad
s 
de
ns
ity
U
rb
an
 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
de
ns
ity
 in
 
80
0
U
rb
an
 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
de
ns
ity
 a
t 
co
nq
ue
st
A
v.
 u
rb
an
 
po
p.
de
ns
. a
t 
co
nq
ue
st
 in
 
th
e 
C
hr
is
tia
n 
ki
ng
do
m
C
en
tu
rie
s 
un
de
r 
M
us
lim
 
do
m
in
at
io
n
C
ro
w
n 
of
 
A
ra
go
n
M
ad
rid
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
16
**
*
-0
.0
16
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
A
dd
iti
on
al
 c
on
tro
l
-0
.0
46
0.
00
01
0.
00
04
-0
.0
15
**
-0
.0
07
0.
01
4
-0
.0
10
0.
13
9*
**
0.
35
6*
**
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
23
)
R
2
0.
30
0.
31
0.
30
0.
3
0.
31
0.
30
0.
30
0.
31
0.
38
0.
36
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
La
tit
ud
e
Te
m
pe
ra
-
tu
re
R
ai
nf
al
l
H
um
id
ity
So
il 
qu
al
ity
La
nd
 
su
ita
bi
lit
y 
fo
r s
ug
ar
La
nd
 
su
ita
bi
lit
y 
fo
r c
ot
to
n
La
nd
 
su
ita
bi
lit
y 
fo
r t
ob
ac
co
A
ve
ra
ge
 
al
tit
ud
e 
R
ug
ge
dn
es
s
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
(1
6)
(1
7)
(1
8)
(1
9)
(2
0)
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
2*
**
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
23
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
2*
**
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
A
dd
iti
on
al
 c
on
tro
l
0.
00
6
0.
00
5
0.
00
00
0.
00
6
0.
36
9*
**
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
1*
0.
09
7
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
00
08
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
62
)
R
2
0.
31
0.
30
0.
30
0.
32
0.
46
0.
30
0.
30
0.
30
0.
33
0.
33
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
H
is
to
ri
ca
l c
on
tr
ol
s
TA
B
LE
 1
 - 
TH
E 
EF
FE
C
T 
O
F 
TH
E 
R
EC
O
N
Q
U
ES
T 
O
N
 C
U
R
R
EN
T 
D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
(I)
N
ot
es
:
V
ar
ia
bl
es
de
sc
rip
tio
ns
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
in
Ta
bl
e
A
1.
Th
e
es
tim
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
a
co
ns
ta
nt
te
rm
,w
hi
ch
is
om
itt
ed
fo
r
sp
ac
e
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ns
.R
ob
us
t
st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
, *
* 
an
d 
**
* 
de
no
te
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
, 5
 a
nd
 1
%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
R
at
e 
of
 R
ec
on
qu
es
t
N
eo
lit
hi
c 
co
nt
ro
ls
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
 lo
g 
G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 in
 2
00
5
C
lim
at
ic
, g
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
an
d 
to
po
gr
ap
hi
c 
fa
ct
or
s
Ba
sic
 
re
la
tio
n-
sh
ip
R
at
e 
of
 R
ec
on
qu
es
t
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
ed
ite
-
rr
an
ea
n 
Se
a
A
tla
nt
ic
 
O
ce
an
C
an
ta
br
ia
n 
Se
a
Is
la
nd
C
oa
st
 D
um
m
y
C
oa
st
 le
ng
th
/ 
su
rf
ac
e 
ar
ea
D
is
ta
nc
e 
to
 
th
e 
co
as
t
B
or
de
r w
ith
 
Po
rtu
ga
l
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
16
**
*
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
A
dd
iti
on
al
 c
on
tro
l
0.
07
9
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
20
0.
08
0.
03
8
0.
32
9
-0
.0
47
*
-0
.1
64
**
*
(0
.0
55
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.3
07
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
54
)
R
2
0.
33
0.
30
0.
30
0.
31
0.
31
0.
31
0.
35
0.
38
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fr
om
 
M
ad
rid
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fr
om
 
Lo
nd
on
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fr
om
 P
ar
is
A
gr
ic
. 
la
nd
 1
90
0 
(%
)
A
ra
bl
e 
la
nd
 
19
62
 (%
)
M
in
in
g 
ou
tp
ut
 
in
 1
86
0
C
oa
l d
um
m
y 
in
 1
86
0
C
oa
l o
ut
pu
t i
n 
18
60
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
(1
6)
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
16
**
*
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
2*
**
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
19
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
A
dd
iti
on
al
 c
on
tro
l
0.
00
2
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
10
0.
15
6
-0
.0
69
0.
00
7*
*
0.
06
1
0.
00
3
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.1
93
)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
05
)
R
2
0.
30
0.
32
0.
33
0.
31
0.
30
0.
35
0.
31
0.
3
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
50
50
50
48
50
50
50
50
TA
B
LE
 2
 - 
TH
E 
EF
FE
C
T 
O
F 
TH
E 
R
EC
O
N
Q
U
ES
T 
O
N
 C
U
R
R
EN
T 
D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T 
(II
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is 
lo
g 
G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 in
 2
00
5
R
at
e 
of
 R
ec
on
qu
es
t
N
ot
es
:
V
ar
ia
bl
es
de
sc
rip
tio
ns
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
in
Ta
bl
e
A
1.
Th
e
es
tim
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
a
co
ns
ta
nt
te
rm
,
w
hi
ch
is
om
itt
ed
fo
r
sp
ac
e
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ns
.
R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
, *
* 
an
d 
**
* 
de
no
te
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
, 5
 a
nd
 1
%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
R
at
e 
of
 R
ec
on
qu
es
t
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
co
nt
ro
ls
 re
la
te
d 
to
 tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
co
st
s
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
c 
co
nt
ro
ls
 re
la
te
d 
to
 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
co
st
s (
co
nt
in
ue
d)
N
at
ur
al
 re
so
ur
ce
s e
nd
ow
m
en
ts
45 
 
Baseline 
specification Leverage
Standard. 
residuals/ Student. 
residuals
Cook’s 
distance/ Dfits
Welsch 
distance DF-Beta
Initial resistance 
provinces 
removed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
-0.016* -0.047 -0.015*** 0.006 -0.047 -0.061* -0.017**
(0.008) (0.039) (0.004) (0.032) (0.039) (0.031) (0.008)
Crown of Aragon 0.093** 0.094** 0.12*** 0.087** 0.094** 0.105** 0.127**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.033) (0.042) (0.042) (0.04) (0.047)
Madrid 0.412*** n.a. 0.409*** 0.435*** 0.397*** 0.389*** 0.417***
(0.061) n.a. (0.052) (0.063) (0.065) (0.053) (0.058)
Distance to the coast -0.027 -0.022 -0.04 -0.051* -0.022 -0.012 -0.023
(0.032) (0.03) (0.027) (0.03) (0.03) (0.025) (0.028)
Border with Portugal -0.034 -0.043 -0.041 -0.019 -0.043 -0.062 -0.052
(0.046) (0.046) (0.037) (0.048) (0.047) (0.043) (0.045)
Altitude (average) -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Soil quality 0.319*** 0.32*** 0.307*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.223**
(0.083) (0.084) (0.075) (0.084) (0.085) (0.077) (0.085)
Mining output in 1860 0.006* 0.005* 0.006** 0.006** 0.005* 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R 2 0.68 0.65 0.8 0.68 0.67 0.75 0.67
Number of observations 50 48 46 48 49 44 45
TABLE 3 - THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Outliers are the following:
Column 2, Madrid and Córdoba; Column 3, Alicante, Granada, Jaén and Álava; Column 4, Granada and Córdoba. Column 5, Córdoba.
Column 6, Córdoba, Huelva, Jaén, Murcia, Sevilla and Álava. Initial resistance provinces in column 7 are Asturias, Cantabria, Guipúzcoa,
Vizcaya and Álava.
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Rate of Reconquest
Urban population density in 
800
 
46 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.149** -0.14** -0.005** -0.004* -0.131*** -0.127***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.002) (0.002) (0.042) (0.038)
Population (log) -0.112 0.387* 0.006 0.004 -0.377*** -0.213**
(0.222) (0.206) (0.011) (0.01) (0.107) (0.103)
Latitude 4.641*** 2.929*** 0.046 0.058** 0.943 0.525
(1.155) (0.946) (0.03) (0.028) (0.591) (0.576)
Distance to Madrid 0.021 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.007
(0.02) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance to Madrid squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.00001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to the coast 0.008 -0.047* 0.000 0.000 0.012 -0.01
(0.03) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015)
Distance to the coast squared 0.000 0.0002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to the nearest capital -0.184*** -0.219*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.049*** -0.056***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.012)
Distance to the nearest capital squared 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.00004*** 0.00003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Provincial capital dummy 1.704 -0.209 -0.246*** -0.227*** 1.47** 0.947
(1.187) (1.212) (0.05) (0.049) (0.598) (0.582)
Altitude 0.007*** 0.0001** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Nutrient availability -0.91 0.011 0.05
(0.616) (0.017) (0.424)
Nutrient retention capacity 1.145 0.026 0.243
(0.811) (0.02) (0.39)
Rooting conditions -0.422 0.027** -0.008
(0.424) (0.01) (0.196)
Oxygen availability to roots 0.564 0.007 -0.885*
(0.814) (0.022) (0.521)
Excess salts 0.702 0.006 0.824*
(0.657) (0.013) (0.465)
Toxicity 0.864 -0.013 0.233
(0.639) (0.026) (0.257)
Workability 0.464 -0.005 0.57**
(0.462) (0.014) (0.226)
Annual average temperature -0.043 0.002*** -0.021
(0.027) (0.001) (0.017)
Annual rainfall 0.005 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.000) (0.002)
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.58 0.60 0.52 0.53 0.23 0.24
Number of observations 8098 8041 8098 8041 8098 8041
TABLE 4 - MUNICIPALITY-LEVEL ANALYSIS: PROVINCE FIXED-EFFECTS REGRESSIONS
Dependent variable is:
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The estimations include a constant term and province dummies, which are omitted for space
considerations. Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level,
respectively.
Average socioeconomic condition Labor force activity rateAverage number of vehicles per household
Rate of Reconquest
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Baseline 
specification Leverage
Standard. 
residuals/ Student. 
residuals
Cook’s 
distance Dfits
Welsch 
distance DF-Beta
Initial resistance 
provinces 
removed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.274*** -0.262*** -0.291*** -0.296*** -0.296*** -0.291*** -0.313*** -0.230***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.05) (0.051) (0.05) (0.036) (0.055)
-0.017** -0.055*** -0.016** -0.052** -0.052** -0.042* -0.032* -0.017**
(0.007) (0.02) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.007)
Crown of Aragon 0.12*** 0.118*** 0.122*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.117*** 0.087** 0.147***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.04)
Madrid 0.433*** n.a. 0.423*** n.a. 0.4*** 0.445*** 0.434*** 0.438***
(0.058) n.a. (0.053) n.a. (0.052) (0.06) (0.058) (0.053)
Distance to the coast -0.076** -0.068** -0.076** -0.072** -0.072** -0.092*** -0.081** -0.066**
(0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.03) (0.027)
Border with Portugal -0.047 -0.054 -0.07** -0.073** -0.073** -0.062* -0.057* -0.053
(0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.037)
Altitude (average) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Soil quality 0.387*** 0.393*** 0.413*** 0.452*** 0.452*** 0.421*** 0.433*** 0.308***
(0.08) (0.079) (0.067) (0.072) (0.073) (0.079) (0.066) (0.085)
Mining output in 1860 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
R 2 0.77 0.75 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.83 0.76
Number of observations 50 48 47 46 47 48 43 45
TABLE 5 - AN ALTERNATIVE INDICATOR OF THE RECONQUEST: POST-1212 CONQUEST
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Post-1212 conquest
Urban population density in 
800
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Outliers are the following: Column 2, Madrid and Córdoba;
Column 3, Ciudad Real, Cáceres and Álava; Column 4, Ciudad Real, Cáceres, Córdoba and Madrid. Column 5, Ciudad Real, Cáceres and Córdoba. Column 6,
Cáceres and Córdoba. Column 7, Almería, Balearic Islands, Castellón, Cáceres, Córdoba, Jaén and Álava. Initial resistance provinces in column 8 are Asturias,
Cantabria, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Álava.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.011*** -0.026***
(0.003) (0.005)
-0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.001)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.63
Number of observations 200 200 200 200
TABLE 8 - THE TIMING OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST: PANEL RESULTS
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The dependent variables GDP and industrial output per capita are
expressed in relative terms with respect to the national average in each period. The panel consists of four data points: 1860,
1930, 1971 and 2005. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Rate of Reconquest * UK industrial 
output
Rate of Reconquest * US industrial 
output
Dependent variable is relative GDP per 
capita (average=100)
Dependent variable is relative industrial 
output per capita (average=100)
Reduced-form results Reduced-form results
 
1860 1930 1971 2005 1860 1930 1970 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Regression Results
0.010 -0.015* -0.023*** -0.019*** 0.034*** -0.041*** -0.056*** -0.040***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.01) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016* 0.005 0.012 -0.009 -0.028
(0.021) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.027)
Crown of Aragon 0.142 0.184* 0.131** 0.093** 0.248 0.2 0.196 0.201
(0.099) (0.098) (0.053) (0.041) (0.201) (0.169) (0.145) (0.198)
Madrid 0.595*** 0.909*** 0.638*** 0.412*** 0.711*** 0.978*** 0.432** -0.136
(0.12) (0.139) (0.082) (0.061) (0.171) (0.281) (0.181) (0.176)
Distance to the coast 0.032 0.001 -0.016 -0.027 0.086 -0.033 0.066 0.1
(0.066) (0.068) (0.038) (0.032) (0.084) (0.155) (0.1) (0.117)
Border with Portugal -0.15 -0.118 -0.046 -0.034 -0.334* -0.238 -0.007 -0.181
(0.149) (0.098) (0.071) (0.046) (0.187) (0.219) (0.2) (0.224)
Altitude (average) 0.000 -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0005** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Soil quality 0.781** 0.369** 0.426*** 0.319*** 0.554 0.962** 0.693* 0.177
(0.34) (0.171) (0.119) (0.083) (0.411) (0.422) (0.348) (0.346)
Mining output in 1860 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.006* 0.021 0.016 0.029** 0.03**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
R 2 0.48 0.63 0.71 0.68 0.46 0.60 0.56 0.33
Number of observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Panel B: Standardized Effects
Rate of Reconquest 0.171 -0.278 -0.512 -0.554 0.363 -0.354 -0.564 -0.411
TABLE 7 - THE TIMING OF THE EFFECT OF THE RECONQUEST
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. GDP and industrial output variables are all expressed in pesetas. The estimations include a constant
term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level,
respectively.
Rate of Reconquest
Dependent variable:
Log GDP per capita in: Log industrial output per capita in:
Urban population density in 800
50 
 
 
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
(1
6)
Pa
ne
l A
: R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
Re
su
lts -
0.
01
8*
**
-0
.0
19
**
*
2.
48
4*
**
2.
37
4*
**
0.
01
3*
**
0.
01
4*
**
-0
.2
33
-0
.5
28
**
*
0.
17
3
0.
30
4
-0
.0
00
3
-0
.0
00
5
-0
.0
08
**
*
-0
.0
04
*
0.
00
01
-0
.0
00
1
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.3
75
)
(0
.4
52
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.1
39
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.2
03
)
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
00
4)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
1)
-0
.0
16
*
0.
72
3
0.
00
1
0.
28
9
-0
.4
29
-0
.0
01
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
**
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.6
42
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.2
75
)
(0
.2
75
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
00
)
C
ro
w
n 
of
 A
ra
go
n
0.
09
3*
*
9.
99
5*
0.
05
8
-8
.8
42
**
*
-0
.5
87
0.
00
0
0.
10
4*
**
0.
00
2*
(0
.0
41
)
(5
.3
74
)
(0
.0
65
)
(2
.7
8)
(2
.0
4)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
01
)
M
ad
rid
0.
41
2*
**
13
.9
38
**
0.
17
3*
**
12
.8
91
**
*
-4
.1
56
0.
01
2*
*
-0
.0
02
0.
00
6*
**
(0
.0
61
)
(5
.5
6)
(0
.0
46
)
(2
.8
77
)
(2
.8
56
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
38
)
(0
.0
02
)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
to
 th
e 
co
as
t
-0
.0
27
1.
11
0.
07
1*
*
-0
.0
92
-0
.5
94
0.
00
5*
-0
.0
09
0.
00
1
(0
.0
32
)
(3
.0
13
)
(0
.0
27
)
(1
.4
46
)
(1
.3
85
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
01
)
B
or
de
r w
ith
 P
or
tu
ga
l
-0
.0
34
-6
.0
43
-0
.0
14
3.
53
2
7.
78
7*
*
-0
.0
07
0.
05
0.
00
3*
(0
.0
46
)
(5
.6
42
)
(0
.0
57
)
(2
.1
41
)
(3
.1
52
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
02
)
A
lti
tu
de
 (a
ve
ra
ge
)
-0
.0
00
1
0.
00
3
0.
00
02
-0
.0
06
0.
00
1
0.
00
0
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
)
So
il 
qu
al
ity
0.
31
9*
**
27
.0
25
**
*
0.
10
9
3.
14
7
-1
5.
09
9*
*
0.
02
3*
-0
.2
97
**
*
0.
00
8*
**
(0
.0
83
)
(8
.5
87
)
(0
.1
24
)
(4
.9
78
)
(5
.7
57
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.0
02
)
M
in
in
g 
ou
tp
ut
 in
 1
86
0
0.
00
6*
-0
.2
11
-0
.0
06
**
-0
.1
32
-0
.3
52
*
0.
00
0
-0
.0
02
0.
00
0
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.2
91
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
92
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
00
)
R
2
0.
3
0.
68
0.
48
0.
66
0.
15
0.
53
0.
05
0.
42
0.
02
0.
55
0.
01
0.
29
0.
15
0.
57
0.
03
0.
48
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
50
50
50
50
50
50
47
47
48
48
50
50
50
50
50
50
Pa
ne
l B
: S
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d 
Ef
fe
ct
s
R
at
e 
of
 R
ec
on
qu
es
t
-0
.5
48
-0
.5
54
0.
69
3
0.
66
2
0.
38
9
0.
40
7
-0
.2
08
-0
.4
70
0.
12
8
0.
22
5
-0
.1
20
-0
.2
01
-0
.3
93
-0
.1
92
0.
13
4
-0
.1
34
TA
B
LE
 9
 - 
M
EC
H
A
N
IS
M
S 
A
T 
W
O
R
K
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
Re
lig
io
si
ty
 
(C
le
ri
ca
l 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
in
 1
79
7)
R
at
e 
of
 R
ec
on
qu
es
t
U
rb
an
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
de
ns
ity
 
in
 8
00
N
ot
es
:
V
ar
ia
bl
es
de
sc
rip
tio
ns
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
in
Ta
bl
e
A
1.
G
D
P
an
d
in
du
st
ria
l
ou
tp
ut
va
ria
bl
es
ar
e
al
l
ex
pr
es
se
d
in
pe
se
ta
s.
Th
e
es
tim
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
a
co
ns
ta
nt
te
rm
,
w
hi
ch
is
om
itt
ed
fo
r
sp
ac
e
co
ns
id
er
at
io
ns
. R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
, *
* 
an
d 
**
* 
de
no
te
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
, 5
 a
nd
 1
%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
Lo
g 
G
PD
 p
er
 
ca
pi
ta
 2
00
5
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
la
nd
le
ss
 w
or
ke
rs
 
17
97
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
vi
lla
ge
s a
nd
 c
iti
es
 
un
de
r s
ei
gn
eu
ri
al
 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
in
 1
79
7
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
de
ns
ity
 
in
 1
59
4
M
oo
ri
sh
 a
nc
es
tr
y
M
ar
ke
t 
fr
ag
m
en
ta
tio
n 
(R
oa
d 
de
ns
ity
 in
 
17
60
)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
vi
lla
ge
s a
nd
 c
iti
es
 
un
de
r C
hu
rc
h 
ju
ri
sd
ic
tio
n 
in
 1
79
7
51 
 
 
Li
te
ra
cy
 
ra
te
 
Sc
ho
ol
 
en
ro
llm
en
t
In
fa
nt
 
m
or
ta
lit
y
Li
fe
 
ex
pe
ct
an
cy
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
el
ec
to
rs
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f 
vo
te
rs
C
ri
m
es
C
on
vi
ct
s
Ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
Ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
’s
 
sh
ar
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
-0
.8
27
**
*
-0
.0
06
**
*
4.
76
4*
**
-0
.3
67
**
*
-0
.0
02
**
-0
.0
02
**
0.
06
5*
**
0.
04
8*
**
3.
86
4
0.
03
1
(0
.2
49
)
(0
.0
02
)
(1
.1
22
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.0
12
)
(5
.5
18
)
(0
.2
68
)
-0
.2
24
0.
00
0
-3
.7
68
**
0.
10
9
-0
.0
01
0.
00
1*
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
41
*
12
.2
94
0.
68
1
(0
.3
64
)
(0
.0
02
)
(1
.6
34
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
21
)
(2
6.
35
8)
(0
.4
98
)
C
ro
w
n 
of
 A
ra
go
n
-9
.2
3*
**
-0
.0
28
10
.9
27
-1
.0
96
0.
01
-0
.0
23
**
0.
56
6*
*
0.
34
8
63
.4
7
6.
15
9
(2
.9
81
)
(0
.0
24
)
(1
4.
29
5)
(1
.3
68
)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.2
63
)
(0
.2
38
)
(7
4.
53
5)
(4
.4
94
)
M
ad
rid
15
.8
18
**
*
-0
.0
85
**
*
61
.4
99
**
*
-4
.5
25
**
*
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
29
**
*
2.
15
4*
**
1.
16
3*
**
-2
59
.7
29
**
*
-3
6.
45
7*
**
(4
.2
51
)
(0
.0
3)
(1
2.
56
8)
(1
.4
63
)
(0
.0
1)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.2
86
)
(0
.2
21
)
(8
5.
2)
(4
.2
5)
D
is
ta
nc
e 
to
 th
e 
co
as
t
1.
93
9
0.
02
2
16
.9
51
**
-1
.9
17
**
0.
00
9
-0
.0
02
0.
37
8*
*
0.
25
6*
*
-5
9.
49
2
-1
.1
88
(2
.2
95
)
(0
.0
15
)
(7
.2
95
)
(0
.7
94
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.1
18
)
(6
9.
61
8)
(2
.3
1)
B
or
de
r w
ith
 P
or
tu
ga
l
0.
48
5
0.
04
4*
-2
9.
76
4*
3.
48
6*
*
-0
.0
03
0.
00
9
-0
.1
44
-0
.1
86
-1
9.
13
8
9.
44
4*
(3
.1
88
)
(0
.0
24
)
(1
7.
64
)
(1
.4
65
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.2
3)
(0
.1
58
)
(9
6.
89
6)
(4
.8
86
)
A
lti
tu
de
 (a
ve
ra
ge
)
0.
00
3
0.
00
01
*
0.
02
7
-0
.0
06
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
*
0.
35
0.
02
6*
**
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.2
36
)
(0
.0
07
)
So
il 
qu
al
ity
4.
59
9
0.
05
5
56
.5
51
**
-3
.8
82
0.
04
7*
*
0.
03
2*
0.
62
9
0.
39
9
30
9.
43
*
-1
2.
35
1*
(6
.7
52
)
(0
.0
62
)
(2
3.
13
9)
(2
.5
95
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.4
31
)
(0
.3
73
)
(1
78
.3
96
)
(6
.4
64
)
M
in
in
g 
ou
tp
ut
 in
 1
86
0
0.
22
8
0.
00
2
-1
.5
95
**
-0
.0
12
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
-0
.0
07
0.
00
7
-2
.3
42
-0
.1
44
(0
.2
47
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.7
34
)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
13
)
(6
.1
3)
(0
.2
35
)
R
2
0.
44
0.
45
0.
62
0.
64
0.
45
0.
43
0.
65
0.
59
0.
23
0.
50
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
N
ot
es
:V
ar
ia
bl
es
de
sc
rip
tio
ns
ar
e
pr
ov
id
ed
in
Ta
bl
e
A
1.
G
D
P
an
d
in
du
st
ria
lo
ut
pu
tv
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
al
le
xp
re
ss
ed
in
pe
se
ta
s.
Th
e
es
tim
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
e
a
co
ns
ta
nt
te
rm
,w
hi
ch
is
om
itt
ed
 fo
r s
pa
ce
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
ns
. R
ob
us
t s
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. *
, *
* 
an
d 
**
* 
de
no
te
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
, 5
 a
nd
 1
%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
R
at
e 
of
 R
ec
on
qu
es
t
U
rb
an
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
de
ns
ity
 
in
 8
00
TA
B
LE
 1
0 
- O
U
TC
O
M
ES
 IN
D
IC
A
TO
R
S 
IN
 T
H
E 
18
60
s
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
52 
 
Figure 1. The Spanish Reconquest (711-1492)
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Figure 2. Conditional relationship between current GDP per capita and rate of Reconquest 
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This appendix includes: 
Table A1. Description of variables. 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics. 
Table A3. Replication of Table 1 using Conley standard errors. 
Table A4. Replication of Table 2 using Conley standard errors. 
Table A5. Replication of Table 3 using Conley standard errors. 
Table A6. Including geographic coordinates and a cubic polynomial in longitude and latitude. 
Table A7. Replication of Table 1 using the Post-1212 conquest indicator. 
Table A8. Replication of Table 2 using the Post-1212 conquest indicator. 
Table A9. Replication of Table 1 using an alternative indicator of rate of Reconquest. 
Table A10. Replication of Table 2 using an alternative indicator of rate of Reconquest. 
Table A11. Replication of Table 3 using an alternative indicator of rate of Reconquest. 
Table A12. Replication of Table 6 using the complete set of controls. 
Table A13. Correlations between indicators of pre-Reconquest development and suitability for agriculture. 
Table A14. Replication of Table 6 using the Post-1212 conquest indicator. 
Table A15. Replication of Table 6 using the Post-1212 conquest indicator and the complete set of controls. 
Table A16. Replication of Table 7 using the Post-1212 conquest indicator. 
Table A17. The effect of rate of Reconquest on the average size of municipalities. 
Figure A1. Current income distribution in the Spanish provinces. 
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Variable Description Source
Main dependent variables
Log GDP per capita Lof of GDP per capita  in 1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005. Rosés et al (2010) for 1860 and 
1930; Carreras et al. (2005) for 
1971; Spanish Regional 
Accounts. Base 2000 (INE) for 
2005.
Log industrial output per 
capita
Log of industrial output per capita  in 1860, 1930, 1970 and 2005. Rosés et al. (2010) for 1860; 
Carreras (2005) for 1930 and 
1970; Spanish Regional 
Accounts. Base 2000 (INE) for 
2005.
Reconquest indicators
Rate of Reconquest This variable is created (using ArcGIS) as follows. We overlap the Reconquest
map from Mestre-Campi and Sabaté (1998) with a geo-referenced map of the
Spanish provinces. We also overlap a map of the initial resistance area
(http://explorethemed.com/Reconquista.asp) with the map of Spanish provinces.
We then draw the lines of each stage of the Reconquest as well as a line
separating Castile and Aragon. We calculate the surface area corresponding to
each stage of the Reconquest for Castile and Aragon. Next, we divide the
reconquered area in each stage by the duration in years that each stage lasted for,
thus obtaining a measure of the rate of Reconquest. Since the area of a province
can partially cover more than one stage of the Reconquest, we calculate its area
within each of the respective stages. We then compute the weighted average of
the rate of Reconquest of each province, where the weights are given by the
percentage of the province area conquered in each stage. The variable is
expressed in 100 km2/year.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998).
Post-1212 conquest Dummy variable indicating whether the province was reconquered after the
collapse of the Almohad Empire in 1212 in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998) and Guichard 
(2002), among others.
Rate of Reconquest 
(alternative)
This indicator is calculated as follows: (i) Provinces are classified according to
the century in which they were reconquered. In this way, the Reconquest is
divided in stages of the same duration. The five Cantabrian provinces not
occupied by the Muslim are considered separately, with a value equal to 0. (ii)
For each century, we compute the total land area reconquered in that period,
differentiating between the areas conquered by Castile and Aragon. (iii) Then,
the rate of Reconquest in a given province is the total land area that was
reconquered in the century in which that province was reconquered, expressed in
100 km2/year. 
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998).
Controls
Agricultural land in 1900 (%) Percentage of agricultural area over provincial surface area in 1900. Barciela et al. (2005).
Arable land in 1962 (%) Percentage of arable land over total surface area. 1962 agricultural census (INE) 
(www.ine.es).
Average altitude Average altitude of the province (simple average of the municipalities of the
province)
Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (Instituto Geográfico 
Nacional -IGN- 2012).
Average urban population 
density at conquest in the 
Christian kingdom
Average density of urban population (inhabitants in cities greater than or equal to
5000 inhabitants over provincial surface area in km2) in Castile or Aragon just
before the conquest of the province.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Bairoch (1988).
Border with Portugal Dummy variable indicating whether the province is in the border with Portugal. Authors’ elaboration.
Centuries under Muslim 
domination
Number of centuries that the province was under Muslim domination. It is
calculated as the closest integer to the difference between the year of the
Reconquest of the capital city of the province and the date of the Muslim
invasion (711).
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Mestre-Campi 
and Sabaté (1998) and Guichard 
(2002), among others.
Coal dummy in 1860 Dummy variable indicating whether the province had some coal mine in 1860. 1860-1861 Statistical Yearbook of 
Spain (Junta General de 
Estadística -JGE- 1863).
Coal output in 1860 Logarithm of the value created by coal mining in 1860. 1860-1861 Statistical Yearbook of 
Spain (JGE 1863a).
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Variable Description Source
Controls (continued )
Coast dummy Dummy variable indicating whether the province has coast. Authors’ elaboration.
Coast length/ surface area Length of coast over surface area. Physical variables. Territory 
(INE) (www.ine.es).
Crown of Aragon Dummy variable capturing whether the province belonged to the Crown of
Aragon.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance from London and 
from Paris
Linear distance between the centroid of the province and London or Paris (in 100
km), using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance from Madrid Linear distance between the centroid of the province and Madrid (in 100 km),
using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance to the coast Linear distance between the centroid of the province and the nearest point of the
coast (in 100 km), using ArcGIS. For the three provinces that are islands, this
variable takes the value of 0.
Authors’ elaboration.
Humidity, Temperature and 
Rainfall
Annual average temperature, rainfall and relative humidity. Standard Climate Values 
(Agencia Estatal de Meteorología 
2012).
Island Dummy variable indicating whether the province is an island. Authors’ elaboration.
Latitude Latitude of the centroid of the province, using ArcGIS. Authors’ elaboration.
Land suitability for cotton Provincial average of the crop suitability index for low input level rain-fed
cotton.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from FAO/IIASA (2010).
Land suitability for sugar Provincial average of the crop suitability index for low input level rain-fed
sugarcane.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from FAO/IIASA (2010).
Land suitability for tobacco Provincial average of the crop suitability index for low input level rain-fed
tobacco.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from FAO/IIASA (2010).
Madrid Dummy variable indicating the capital city of Spain. Authors’ elaboration.
Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic 
Ocean, Cantabrian Sea
Dummy variables indicating whether the province has access to the
Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean or the Cantabrian Sea.
Authors’ elaboration.
Mining output in 1860 Logarithm of the value created by the mining industry in 1860. 1860-1861 Statistical Yearbook of 
Spain (JGE 1863a).
Roman roads density Length of Roman roads (in meters) over provincial surface area (in km2). Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from García de 
Cortázar (2007).
Ruggedness Coefficient of variation of the altitude of the municipalities of the province. Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (Instituto Geográfico 
Nacional -IGN- 2012).
Soil quality Average of seven key soil dimensions important for crop production: nutrient
availability, nutrient retention capacity, rooting conditions, oxygen availability to
roots, excess salts, toxicities, and workability. For each component, we calculate
the provincial average value.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Fischer et al. (2008).
Urban population density in 
800
Density of urban population (inhabitants in cities greater than or equal to 5000
inhabitants over provincial surface area in km2) in 800.
Bairoch (1988).
Urban population density at 
conquest
Density of urban population (inhabitants in cities greater than or equal to 5000
inhabitants over provincial surface area in km2) in the latest available date
previous to the conquest of the province by the Christians.
Authors’ elaboration using 
information from Bairoch (1988).
Wooded steppe (% area) Percentage of province area that was subject to wooded steppe 10,000 years ago. Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and information from 
Olsson and Paik (2013).
Years since transition to 
agriculture
This variable is constructed for each province using the following equation:
Y(S 0 )=Σ λi Y(S i ), where Y(S 0 ) is the predicted date of adoption of agriculture
for the centroid of each respective province (denoted by S 0 ). Σ means a sum
from site 1 to N, where N is the number of measured sample points surrounding
S 0 . We restrict the measured sample points to those located in the Iberian
Peninsula that make a total of 13 Neolithic sites. Y(S i ) is the observed value of
the predicted date of early adoption of agriculture in Neolithic site S i . λi are
weights calculated as λi= (D/d i )/Σ(D/d i ), where Σ λi = 1 and d i is the distance
between S 0 and each Neolithic site S i . D = Σd i is the total sum of the 13 d i for
the centroid of each respective province (S 0 ). Note that (D/d i ) implies that we
assign greater weights to those sites located closer to the centroid of each
province.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Pinhasi, 
Fort and Ammerman (2005).
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Variable Description Source
Variables of pre-Reconquest development
Ancient settlements over 
surface area
Number of ancient (pre-medieval) settlements over provincial surface area (in
1,000 km2).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Pleiades 
(2014).
City population in 800 Inhabitants (in thousands) in cities greater than or equal to 5000 inhabitants in
800.
Bairoch (1988).
Coinage of imperial Roman 
coins over surface area
Number of points of coinage of imperial Roman coins over provincial surface
area (in 1,000 km2).
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from García de Cortázar (2007).
Number of bishoprics circa 
600 over surface area
Number of bishoprics circa 600 over provincial surface area (in 1,000 km2). Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Digital Atlas of Roman and 
Medieval Civilizations.
Roman roads density: Main 
roads
Length of the main Roman roads (in meters) over provincial surface area (in
km2).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from García de 
Cortázar (2007).
Roman villas over surface 
area
Number of Roman villas over provincial surface area (in 1,000 km2). Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Pleiades 
(2014).
UK and US industrial output
Total UK industrial output Total industrial output of the United Kingdom in 1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005.
Base year is 1913.
Mitchell (2007a) and IMF (2013).
Total US industrial output Total industrial output of the United States in 1860, 1930, 1971 and 2005. Base
year is 1899.
Mitchell (2007b) and IMF (2013).
Variables used as mechanisms
Religiosity (Clerical 
population in 1797)
Percentage of population that is member of the clergy (both secular and regular)
in 1797. We impute data from historical regions to current provinces by
estimating (with ArcGIS) the percentage of area in each province that
corresponds to each historical region.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Morales (1998)  and 1797 
population census (INE, 1992).
Moorish ancestry Proportion of Moorish ancestry in the current population of each province. Adams et al. (2008).
Percentage of landless 
workers in 1797
Percentage of landless workers over the agricultural active population in 1797.
We impute data from historical regions to current provinces by estimating (with
ArcGIS) the percentage of area in each province that corresponds to each
historical region.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Morales (1998)  and 1797 
population census (INE, 1992).
Percentage of villages and 
cities under Church 
jurisdiction in 1797
Variable measuring the percentage of villages and cities (“villas” and 
“ciudades”) under ecclesiastical jurisdiction in 1797. We impute data from 
historical regions to current provinces by estimating (with ArcGIS) the 
percentage of area in each province that corresponds to each historical region.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Morales (1998)  and 1797 
population census (INE, 1992).
Percentage of villages and 
cities under seigneurial 
jurisdiction in 1797
Variable measuring the percentage of villages and cities (“villas” and
“ciudades”) under either noble or military order jurisdiction in 1797. We impute
data from historical regions to current provinces by estimating (with ArcGIS) the
percentage of area in each province that corresponds to each historical region.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from Morales (1998)  and 1797 
population census (INE, 1992).
Population density in 1594 Number of inhabitants per square kilometer in 1594. We impute data from
historical regions to current provinces by estimating (with ArcGIS) the
percentage of area in each province that corresponds to each historical region.
Authors’ elaboration using data 
from 1858 Statistical Yearbook of 
Spain (JGE 1860) and INE 
(1982).
Market fragmentation (Road 
density in 1760)
Kilometers of roads in 1760 (“caminos de ruedas”) over provincial surface area
(in km2).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from IGN 
(2008).
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Variable Description Source
Outcomes variables in the 1860s
Agricultural productivity Agricultural output in 1860 divided by the number of male agricultural workers. Authors’ elaboration from Rosés 
et al. (2010), Erdozáin and 
Mikelarena (1999), and the 1860 
population census (JGE 1863b).
Agriculture’s share Agricultural output in 1860 divided by total provincial output. Rosés et al. (2010).
Convicts and Crimes Total crimes committed over total population in 1860 (in thousands). Total
convicts over total population  in 1860 (in thousands).
1860-1861 Statistical Yearbook of 
Spain (JGE 1863a); 1860
population census (JGE 1863b).
Infant mortality Infant mortality rates. Probability of dying (per thousand) of individuals under
one year in 1860.
Regional and provincial mortality
tables. Spain 1860 (Proyecto-
Nisal, 2014).
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth in 1860. Regional and provincial mortality
tables. Spain 1860 (Proyecto-
Nisal, 2014).
Literacy rate Total literacy rates for the adult population in 1860. Núñez (1992).
Percentage of electors and 
voters
Electors (or voters) in the parliamentary election of 1865 as a percentage of the
male population aged 25 or older.
Authors’ elaboration from the
1862-1865 Statistical Yearbook of 
Spain (JGE 1865) and the 1860
population census (JGE 1863b).
School enrollment Total children enrolled over the population under 15 years. Authors’ elaboration from the
1860 population census (JGE
1863b).
Variables at the municipal level
Altitude Altitude corresponding to the municipality centroid. Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (IGN 2012).
Annual average temperature Annual average temperature corresponding to the municipality centroid (in
centigrade degrees multiplied by 10).
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from WorldClim 
(Hijmans et al., 2005).
Annual rainfall Annual precipitation corresponding to the municipality centroid (in millimeters). Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from WorldClim 
(Hijmans et al., 2005).
Average number of vehicles 
per household
Number of vehicles (cars and vans) for personal transport owned by households,
divided by the number of households. The year of measurement is 2001.
INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
Average socioeconomic 
condition
Average of class marks of socioeconomic conditions of individuals (multiplied
by 100). Socioeconomic condition is obtained by combining information from
the variables occupation, activity and professional situation. To illustrate the
construction of this variable, a (maximum) class mark equal to 3 is given to non-
agricultural entrepreneurs with employees, and a (minimun) class mark of 0 to
those unemployed who have not worked previously. The year of measurement is
2001.
INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
Distance to Madrid Linear distance between the centroid of the municipality and Madrid (in km),
using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance to the coast Linear distance between the centroid of the municipality and the nearest point of
the coast (in km), using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Distance to the nearest 
capital
Linear distance between the centroid of the municipality and the nearest
provincial capital (in km), using ArcGIS.
Authors’ elaboration.
Excess salts This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil salinity, soil
sodicity and soil phases influencing salt conditions ”. We calculate the average
value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Labor force activity rate Labor force activity rate of the population between 20 and 59 years old. The year
of measurement is 2001.
INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
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Variable Description Source
Variables at the municipal level (continued )
Latitude Latitude of the municipality centroid. Geographic Nomenclature of 
Municipalities and Local 
Population (IGN 2012).
Nutrient availability This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil texture, soil
organic carbon, soil pH, total exchangeable bases ”. We calculate the average
value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Nutrient retention capacity This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil organic carbon,
soil texture, base saturation, cation exchange capacity of soil and of clay
fraction ”. We calculate the average value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Oxygen availability to roots This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil drainage and soil
phases affecting soil drainage ”. We calculate the average value of the
municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Population Log of total population in 2001. INE. Censos de Población y 
Viviendas 2001 (www.ine.es).
Provincial capital dummy Dummy variable indicating whether the municipality is a provincial capital city. Authors’ elaboration.
Reconquered area This variable is created in a similar way to the provincial level variable. In this
case, we assign to each municipality the reconquered area corresponding to the
stage of the Reconquest to which the municipality centroid belongs.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and information from 
Mestre-Campi and Sabaté (1998).
Rooting conditions This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil textures, bulk
density, coarse fragments, vertic soil properties and soil phases affecting root
penetration and soil depth and soil volume ”. We calculate the average value of
the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Toxicity This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Calcium carbonate
and gypsum ”. We calculate the average value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
Workability This variable assesses the following soil characteristics: “Soil texture, effective
soil depth/volume, and soil phases constraining soil management (soil depth,
rock outcrop, stoniness, gravel/concretions and hardpans) ”. We calculate the
average value of the municipality.
Authors’ elaboration using 
ArcGIS and data from Fischer et 
al. (2008).
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Main dependent variables
Log GDP per capita 1860 (ptas) 50 5.82 0.36 4.38 6.53
Log GDP per capita 1930 (ptas) 50 7.09 0.33 6.54 7.99
Log GDP per capita 1971 (ptas) 50 13.21 0.27 12.75 13.70
Log GDP per capita 2005 (€) 50 9.87 0.20 9.51 10.28
Log industrial output per capita 1860 (ptas) 50 4.06 0.55 2.73 5.44
Log industrial output per capita 1930 (ptas) 50 5.45 0.70 4.26 7.01
Log industrial output per capita 1970 (ptas) 50 9.77 0.59 8.67 11.07
Log industrial output per capita 2005 (€) 50 7.96 0.58 6.68 9.16
Reconquest indicators
Rate of Reconquest 50 7.08 5.94 0.00 22.53
Post-1212 conquest 50 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Rate of Reconquest (Alternative) 50 5.73 4.86 0.00 14.66
Controls
Agricultural land in 1900 (%) 48 0.33 0.15 0.06 0.71
Arable land in 1962 (%) 50 0.40 0.17 0.04 0.80
Average altitude 50 534.90 276.04 111.01 1044.14
Average urban population density at conquest in the 
Christian kingdom
50 0.54 0.53 0.00 1.76
Border with Portugal 50 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Centuries under Muslim domination 50 3.64 2.38 0.00 8.00
Coal dummy in 1860 50 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
Coal output in 1860 50 1.90 4.18 0.00 14.84
Coast dummy 50 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Coast length/ surface area 50 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.29
Crown of Aragon 50 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Distance from London 50 13.20 3.90 9.41 29.57
Distance from Madrid 50 3.57 3.15 0.00 18.34
Distance from Paris 50 11.13 4.04 7.26 28.37
Distance to the coast 50 1.10 0.94 0.00 3.30
Humidity 50 66.84 5.29 57.00 78.00
Temperature 50 14.64 2.82 10.10 21.20
Rainfall 50 575.28 320.77 134.00 1691.00
Island 50 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Latitude 50 40.12 3.17 27.95 43.29
Land suitability for cotton 50 668.20 761.35 0.00 2379.11
Land suitability for sugar 50 2.24 7.46 0.00 34.53
Land suitability for tobacco 50 1327.79 528.66 171.52 2681.86
Madrid 50 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Atlantic Ocean 50 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Cantabrian Sea 50 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Mediterranean Sea 50 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Controls (Continued)
Mining output in 1860 50 10.32 6.04 0.00 17.90
Roman roads density 50 27.04 14.06 0.00 56.45
Roughness 50 0.52 0.34 0.06 1.36
Soil quality 50 -1.54 0.22 -2.13 -1.04
Urban population density in 800 50 0.47 1.72 0.00 11.62
Urban population density at conquest 50 0.86 1.90 0.00 7.91
Wooded steppe (% area) 50 0.38 0.46 0.00 1.00
Years since transition to agriculture 50 7445 34 7339 7530
Variables of pre-Reconquest development (not described yet)
Ancient settlements over surface area 50 1.25 1.14 0.00 5.93
City population in 800 50 6.50 23.84 0.00 160.00
Coinage of imperial Roman coins over surface area 50 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.40
Number of bishoprics circa 600 over surface area 50 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.39
Roman roads density: Main roads 50 6.28 7.04 0.00 30.22
Roman villas over surface area 50 0.26 0.29 0.00 1.57
Variables used as mechanisms
Religiosity (Clerical population in 1797) 50 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Moorish ancestry 48 8.76 8.01 0.00 21.70
Percentage of landless workers in 1797 50 48.12 21.87 3.10 86.01
Percentage of villages and cities under Church 
jurisdiction in 1797
50 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.43
Percentage of villages and cities under seigneurial 
jurisdiction in 1797
50 53.56 20.30 0.00 84.88
Population density in 1594 47 17.98 6.67 7.34 36.24
Market fragmentation (Road density in 1760) 50 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06
Outcomes variables in the 1860s
Agricultural productivity 50 653.31 252.33 122.50 1582.16
Agriculture’s share 50 42.81 12.90 8.16 72.28
Crimes 50 2.28 0.95 0.63 5.20
Convicts 50 1.50 0.70 0.43 3.35
Infant mortality 50 249.41 52.47 131.58 344.72
Life expectancy 50 29.82 5.09 19.68 45.88
Literacy rate 50 27.40 10.71 14.00 53.00
Percentage of electors 50 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.21
Percentage of voters 50 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.13
School enrollment 50 0.23 0.08 0.08 0.42
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Variables at the municipal level
Altitude 8117 613.46 344.00 0.00 1695.00
Annual average temperature 8197 127.51 24.80 24.00 196.00
Annual rainfall 8197 604.79 225.89 113.00 1522.00
Average number of vehicles per household 8108 0.96 0.28 0.00 2.51
Average socioeconomic condition 8108 95.12 14.99 31.00 186.00
Distance to Madrid 8195 290.99 202.62 0.00 1950.28
Distance to the coast 8195 131.93 98.90 0.03 370.87
Distance to the nearest capital 8195 44.14 24.42 0.00 230.53
Excess salts 8137 -1.13 0.41 -5.95 -1.00
Labor force activity rate 8108 74.37 7.10 27.27 100.00
Latitude 8117 40.73 2.12 27.70 43.74
Nutrient availability 8137 -1.26 0.44 -6.14 -1.00
Nutrient retention capacity 8137 -1.17 0.36 -6.08 -1.00
Oxygen availability to roots 8137 -1.03 0.19 -5.95 -1.00
Population 8108 6.55 1.75 1.95 14.89
Provincial capital dummy 8195 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Reconquered area 8191 5.90 5.32 0.00 22.66
Rooting conditions 8137 -2.48 1.01 -6.26 -1.00
Toxicity 8137 -1.12 0.30 -5.95 -1.00
Workability 8137 -2.40 0.77 -6.24 -1.00
TABLE A2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (Continued )
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Baseline 
specification Leverage
Standard. 
residuals/ Student. 
residuals
Cook’s 
distance/ Dfits
Welsch 
distance DF-Beta
Initial resistance 
provinces 
removed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.02*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
-0.016** -0.047 -0.015*** 0.006 -0.047 -0.061** -0.017**
(0.007) (0.032) (0.003) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027) (0.006)
Crown of Aragon 0.093** 0.094** 0.12*** 0.087** 0.094** 0.105*** 0.127***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.036) (0.043)
Madrid 0.412*** n.a. 0.409*** 0.435*** 0.397*** 0.389*** 0.417***
(0.056) n.a. (0.048) (0.058) (0.057) (0.047) (0.052)
Distance to the coast -0.027 -0.022 -0.04 -0.051* -0.022 -0.012 -0.023
(0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025)
Border with Portugal -0.034 -0.043 -0.041 -0.019 -0.043 -0.062 -0.052
(0.041) (0.041) (0.033) (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039)
Altitude (average) -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Soil quality 0.319*** 0.32*** 0.307*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.223***
(0.079) (0.08) (0.069) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.076)
Mining output in 1860 0.006** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.005** 0.004* 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
R 2 0.68 0.65 0.8 0.68 0.67 0.75 0.67
Number of observations 50 48 46 48 49 44 45
TABLE A5. REPLICATION OF TABLE 3 USING CONLEY STANDARD ERRORS
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Rate of Reconquest
Urban population density in 
800
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Conley standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Outliers are the following:
Column 2, Madrid and Córdoba; Column 3, Alicante, Granada, Jaén and Álava; Column 4, Granada and Córdoba. Column 5, Córdoba.
Column 6, Córdoba, Huelva, Jaén, Murcia, Sevilla and Álava. Initial resistance provinces in column 7 are Asturias, Cantabria, Guipúzcoa,
Vizcaya and Álava.  
14 
 
Including geographic 
coordinates (latitude & 
longitude)
Including a cubic polynomial 
in longitude and latitude
(1) (2)
-0.01*** -0.01**
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.02** -0.01***
(0.007) (0.005)
Crown of Aragon 0.06 -0.036
(0.053) (0.051)
Madrid 0.52*** 0.45***
(0.048) (0.028)
Distance to the coast -0.08*** -0.09***
(0.022) (0.025)
Border with Portugal -0.04 -0.29***
(0.041) (0.056)
Altitude (average) 0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000)
Soil quality 0.60*** 0.29**
(0.092) (0.114)
Mining output in 1860 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.002)
R 2 0.81 0.93
Number of observations 50 50
TABLE A6. INCLUDING GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES AND A CUBIC POLYNOMIAL IN 
LONGITUDE AND LATITUDE
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Rate of Reconquest
Urban population density in 800
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The estimations include a constant term,
which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
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Baseline 
specification Leverage
Standard. 
residuals/ Student. 
residuals
Cook’s 
distance/ Dfits
Welsch 
distance DF-Beta
Initial resistance 
provinces 
removed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-0.02*** -0.019*** -0.02*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.015**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
-0.021** -0.074** -0.015*** -0.008 -0.063 -0.026*** -0.021**
(0.011) (0.036) (0.005) (0.027) (0.038) (0.009) (0.01)
Crown of Aragon 0.103** 0.101** 0.13*** 0.09* 0.097** 0.112** 0.145***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.048)
Madrid 0.35*** n.a. 0.379*** 0.307*** 0.285*** 0.281*** 0.376***
(0.063) n.a. (0.054) (0.059) (0.061) (0.06) (0.056)
Distance to the coast -0.001 0.006 -0.023 0.008 0.03 0.033 -0.007
(0.037) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.035) (0.03)
Border with Portugal -0.055 -0.064 -0.042 -0.052 -0.073 -0.095** -0.069
(0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.051) (0.049) (0.046) (0.043)
Altitude (average) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Soil quality 0.242*** 0.259*** 0.242*** 0.268*** 0.272*** 0.223*** 0.15*
(0.081) (0.082) (0.077) (0.082) (0.082) (0.075) (0.074)
Mining output in 1860 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.007** 0.007* 0.007** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R 2 0.65 0.64 0.73 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.65
Number of observations 50 48 47 47 48 47 45
TABLE A11. REPLICATION OF TABLE 3 USING AN ALTERNATIVE INDICATOR OF RATE OF RECONQUEST
Dependent variable is log GDP per capita in 2005
Rate of Reconquest 
(alternative)
Urban population density in 
800
Notes : Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The estimations include a constant term, which is omitted for space considerations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. Outliers are the following:
Column 2, Madrid and Córdoba; Column 3, Alicante, Granada, and Álava; Column 4, Toledo, Granada, and Córdoba. Column 5, Toledo and
Córdoba. Column 6, Toledo, Jaén, and Álava. Initial resistance provinces in column 7 are Asturias, Cantabria, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Álava.  
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Agricultural land 1900 
(%) Arable land 1962 (%)
City population in 800 0.2642* 0.2749*
0.0696 0.0533
Density of urban population in 800 0.2817* 0.2707*
0.0524 0.0573
Years since transition to agriculture -0.0129 -0.1147
0.9308 0.4275
Ancient settlements over surface area 0.1488 0.0628
0.3127 0.6646
Roman roads density: Main roads 0.2941** 0.3915***
0.0425 0.0049
Roman roads density 0.2356+ 0.3676***
0.107 0.0086
Coinage of imperial Roman coins over surface area 0.2478* 0.2091
0.0895 0.145
Roman villas over surface area 0.3869*** 0.3010**
0.0066 0.0337
Number of bishoprics circa 600 over surface area 0.1589 0.1763
0.2808 0.2206
TABLE A13. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDICATORS OF PRE-RECONQUEST DEVELOPMENT AND 
SUITABILITY FOR AGRICULTURE
Notes: Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. For each entry we provide the correlation coefficient (above) 
and the p-value (below). +, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 11, 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5.06*** 4.867*** 6.164*** 6.485*** 0.04 0.026
(0.939) (1.322) (1.117) (1.293) (0.028) (0.041)
1.278 1.937 0.087**
(1.903) (2.117) (0.042)
Crown of Aragon -3.884 -21.268* 0.247
(9.741) (11.929) (0.431)
Madrid -11.667 -43.211* -0.398
(14) (23.726) (0.423)
Distance to the coast 3.522 3.406 -0.247
(5.758) (10.394) (0.215)
Border with Portugal -9.446 -40.233** -0.013
(16.31) (16.055) (0.374)
Altitude (average) -0.017 -0.034 0.0000
(0.021) (0.028) (0.001)
Soil quality -2.951 -55.399* 0.663
(26.418) (30.88) (0.935)
Mining output in 1860 -0.48 0.256 0.032
(0.968) (0.865) (0.033)
R 2 0.61 0.63 0.49 0.62 0.04 0.21
Number of observations 46 46 50 50 50 50
Falsification test:
TABLE A17. THE EFFECT OF RATE OF RECONQUEST ON THE AVERAGE SIZE OF MUNICIPALITIES
Rate of Reconquest
Urban population density in 800
Notes : The dependent variables are measured as the ratio of provincial surface area (in km2) to the number of population entities,
municipalities or ancient settlements, respectively. Variables descriptions are provided in Table A1. The estimations include a constant
term, which is omitted for space considerations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10,
5 and 1% level, respectively.
 Average size of ancient (pre-
medieval) settlements
Average size (in surface area) 
of “singular population 
entities” in 1787
Average size (in surface area) 
of municipalities in 2011
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13435,000000 - 16202,000000
16202,000001 - 17665,000000
17665,000001 - 19853,000000
19853,000001 - 23334,000000
23334,000001 - 29249,000000
GDP pc in 2005:
13,435 - 16,202 €
16, 03 - 17,665 €
17,666 - 19,853 €
19,854 - 23,334 €
23,335 - 29,249 €
GDP pc in 2005
Figure A1. Current income distribution in the Spanish provinces
 
